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PREFACE 
What are the problems and goals of the people of the United States in 
relation to their public lands, especially thos e lands suited for intensive 
agriculture? What are some alternatives to the policies and laws presently 
governing the disposal or use of such lands for agricultural purposes? 
These and related questions are discussed in the papers in this volume to 
help the Public Land Law Review Commission carry out its responsibility for 
recommending ways that the public lands can provide maximum benefit to the 
general public. 
The general public is obviously composed of many publics, and each has 
its own problems , interests, and goals which sometimes conflict. In the 
first paper, "Farm Tenure Problems and Goals of Farmers and Farm Landlords," 
the various publics are separated into two groups: (1) prospective farmers 
who wish to become tenants or owners of public lands suited for crop pro­
duction, and (2)  all the publics, including the prospective farmers, who 
are represented by the government acting as landlord or real estate devel­
oper. 
Some insights into the problems and interes ts of prospective farmers 
are provided by an exploration of the tenure difficulties and goals of 
actual farmers as revealed by the literature. The evidence suggests that 
the most important farm tenure problems are related to the lack of the 
four F's: (1) fixity or security of tenure or occupancy, (2) freedom of 
improvement or long-run management, (3) freedom of operation or short-run 
management, and (4) fair rents or fair land prices and payment plans. 
Attention is also given to the views of farm landlords since their 
views may indicate in some small way those of the general public as rep­
resented by the various federal land management agencies. 
Security of tenure, freedom to improve and to operate, and fair rents 
and payments are also important factors in the experiences of other nations 
which have public lands suitable for agriculture. Various alternatives 
used by several countries for the management or disposal of public lands 
are identified and analyzed in the second paper, "Public Land Disposal by 
Leasehold and Freehold in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Nether­
lands." 
A supplementary article on Australian land policy by K. O. Campbell 
of the University of Sydney is reproduced in the Appendix. 
Russell L. Berry 
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FARM TENURE PROBLEMS AND GOALS OF FARMERS AND FARM LANDLORDS 
Russell L. Berry 
I. The Elusive Nature of Farm Tenure Problems 
The task of determining the crucial farm tenure problems is as diffi­
cult as it is important. As Dewey said, "There is not at first a situ­
ption and a problem, much less just a problem and no situation. There is 
a troubled, perplexed, trying situation, where the difficulty is, as it 
were, spread throughout the entire situation, infecting it as a whole. If 
we knew just what the difficulty was and where it lay, the job of reflec­
tion would be much easier than it is. As the saying truly goes, a question 
well put is half answered. In fact, we know what the problem exactly is 
simultaneously with finding a way out and getting it resolved. Problem and 
solution stand out completely at the same time. Up to that point our 
grasp of the problem has been more or less vague and tentative.111 
That land-tenure research workers' grasp of tenure problems has also 
been vague and tentative has been made clear by Salter, who reviewed 
published research in this field between 1910 and 1945. He concluded: 
In the first place a good deal of the work is not of the 
problem-solving type. Much effort has been given to describing 
existing lease forms and republicizing census data, not with any 
purpose of revealing sources of difficulty or finding solutions, 
but merely to make simple information available to any who might 
be interested in it. Only in [H. cJ Taylor's earliest work and 
a few rare instances since, is there any evidence that investiga­
tions were specifically conducted for the purpose of clarifying 
difficulties and uncovering experiments in which these diffi­
culties had been overcome. 
1John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1933), as 
presented by Randall, Buchler, and Shirk in Readings in Philosophy (New 
York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1946), p. 187 (italics in original). 
Russell L. Berry is Associate Professor of Economics at South Dakota 
State University, Brookings, South Dakota. This paper is a revision of · 
his The Scully Estate and its Cash-Leasing System in the Midwest, Ph.D. 
thesis. Ohio State University, 1966. 
On the contrary • • • there has been an increasing pre­
dominance of reports with no action problem posed, no problem 
explored and no problem solved.2 
Salter goes on to say "it should be recognized that research has 
its roots in problematic situations; that is, it exists because of 
conditions under which there is doubt as to what people should do be­
cause there is conflict between the purposes they are striving to 
achieve and the consequences they are experiencing. There is need for 
sharper attention to the preliminary exploration and clear definition 
of problems--that is, to the statement of doubts and conflicts • • •  The 
next step is to encourage the functional use of hypotheses. Hypotheses 
are suggested alternative lines of action that will lead to the 
achievement of purposes. Their function is to direct the search for 
evidence • • • " ( p. 252) • 
Despite the favorable reaction to Salter's criticism and despite 
the enthusiasm of tenure-research workers for John Dewey's ideas about 
the necessity of exploring troubled, perplexing and difficult situations 
to discover the problem, there remains much doubt and uncertainty about 
the nature of land-tenure problems. For example, in 1955 the Inter­
regional Land Tenure Research Committee, in its "Gray Report," suggests 
that inefficiency, instability and inequality in resource use are the 
relevant social problems; and the objective or the goal is to remove 
them. If this is true, "then the functions of tenure arrangements 
become the creation of necessary incentives and means conducive to (1) 
efficient resource use, (2) stability of resource productivity, and 
(3) equality of access of resources among individuals.113 
These goals were sharply criticized by Bogholt who asked, ''What is 
the basis • • •  for the claim that the situation described as desirable as 
an end is really so? • • •  How was it come by? By what special methods? 
What assurance is given, open to the test of others, that the ends set up 
are desirable, as is asserted?" He goes on to say, "the genuine judgment 
as to what is desirable is the outcome of an inquiry which is instigated by 
an experienced lack or insufficiency in a unique situation. The lack or 
insufficiency, let us call it a gap or discrepancy, is not something that 
2Leonard A. Salter, Jr., A Critical Review of Research in Land Eco­
nomics, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pr�s, 1948), P:- 230. See 
also Joseph Ackerman, "Status and Appraisal of Research in Farm Tenancy," 
Journal of Farm Economics 23 (1941), pp. 229-30. 
3rnterregional Land Tenure Research Committee, Agricultural � 
Tenure Research, Scope and Nature: Reappraisal, 122.2., The Gray Report, 
Farm Foundation ( Chicago, 1955), p. 2. 
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is determined by comparing the existent with an ideal. It is a situation 
directly experienced.114 
The Gray Report was revised in 1962 by Ottoson, Wunderlich and Dies­
slin who found that efficiency, stability and equality as tenure goals 
left much to be desired. "In the first place there can be goals other than 
efficiency, stability and equality of access; such things as economic prog­
ress, distribution of income, political freedom, freedom from economic 
restraint, balanced growth • • •  security and justice come to mind • • •  In 
the second place, and perhaps even more important from the standpoint of 
research, the three objectives suggested in the Gray Report are so general, 
so obscure, that they are of little use empirically.115 
Although 26 areas of suggested tenure research were then outlined, 
the authors "make no pretense this 'listing' approach is the well­
calculated result of a logically constructed system of objectives" (p. 4). 
Because of the confusion in identifying the major tenure problems, 
objectives or goals, it is fitting that the first objective of a farm­
tenure research project should be to determine the problems or to "identify 
the objectives and purposes that people expect tenure arrangements to serve" 
before it attempts to "appraise alternative tenure systems and institutions 
which impede or expedite achievement of objectives" or "examine in detail 
specific arrangements with consideration given to how well they serve the 
aspirations of people involved and the impact on resource use and connnunity 
life.116 
II. The Four F's and Cash Leasing in England 
What was the crucial problem in the tenure situation of English ten­
ants? Ashby notes that during the nineteenth century, English landlord­
tenant problems centered around what were then known as "the three F's: 
Fair rents, fixity of tenure and freedom of cropping, to which was added 
4 Carl M. Bogholt, "Value Judgment and Land Tenure Research," Land 
Tenure Research Workshop, Farm Foundation (Chicago, 1956), pp. 133� 
5Howard W. Ottoson, Gene Wunderlich, and Howard G. Diesslin, Land 
Tenure Research, Scope and Nature, U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS-
119 (1962), pp. 2-3. 
-
6These are the three objectives of South Dakota Agricultural Experi­
ment Station Research Project 371, approved 18 June 1962, a contributing 
project to NC-53 which has similar objectives. 
3 
later freedom of sale of produce. • • Demand on the part of tenants for 
fixity of tenure • • •  or alternately provision for compensation for 
improvements made by the tenant became necessary as agricultural prac­
tices developed and traditional systems no longer sufficed.117 
It would be a mistake, however, to believe that these problems were 
unique to the nineteenth century. Two centuries earlier Walter Blith, 
English Improver Improved (1652) declared, "If a Tenant be at ever so 
great paines or cost for the improvement of his Land, he doth thereby but 
occaision a greater Rack upon himself, or else invests his Land-Lord into 
his cost and labour gratis, or at best lies at his Land-Lord's mercy for 
requitall; which occaisions a neglect of all good Husbandry • • •  Now this 
I humble conceive may be removed, if there were a Law Inacted by which 
every Land-Lord should be obliged, either to give him reasonable allowance 
for his clear Improvement, or else suffer him or his to enjoy it so much 
longer as till he hath a proportionable requitall.118 
Alternatively these early English landlords and tenants were being 
urged to make 21-year leases, such as were being used in Flanders, which 
specified that "whatsoever four indifferent persons (whereof two to bee 
chosen by one and two of the other) should judg the Farm to bee improved 
at the end of his Leas, the Owner was to paie so much in value to the 
Tenant for his improving it.119 
Long-term leases eventually became common in certain parts of England, 
but rapid changes in prices caused them to fall into disfavor with both 
landlord and tenant. The question of compensation for unexhausted value 
still arose at the end of the term, and the tenant who for years had been 
secure became progressively less secure as the term approached its end. 
Some tenants who did not expect the lease to be renewed used the last 
years to "milk" the land. Another reason for the decline in the use of 
long-term leases may have been the decline in the need for major farm 
improvements such as clearing and draining or the assumption of this 
7 A. W. Ashby, "Farm Tenancy," Encyclopaedia Social Science, vol. 6 
(1931), p. 121. A fourth F, freedom to improve, was probably already 
achieved by the time the three F's became a popular expression of tenure 
goals. In any event, freedom to improve was the first of the major tenure 
goals achieved. 
8Lord Ernle, English Farming Past and Present, rev. (London: Frank 
Cass and Co. Ltd., 1961) , p. 113. 
9sir Richard Weston, Discours of the Husbandrie used in Brabrant 
and Flanders (1645; pub. by Samuel Hartlib in 1650 and 1651), as quoted 
by Ernle, English Farming, p. 113. 
4 
responsibility by the landlord. With no major improvements to be made, 
about all the landlord wanted of the tenant was the rent and maintenance 
of the property--requirements as easily met under a short-term lease as 
a long one. So long as these conditions were met, the tenant may have 
enjoyed a strong feeling of security. 
Ashby noted that "tenancies from year to year, in practice for one 
year and then from one year to another until notice to terminate is given 
by one of the parties, are theoretially short term leases. But in prac­
tice agreements for tenancies from year to year may subsist for long 
periods. There are well authenticated cases of continuous occupation of 
one farm by one family for two or three generations under such agreements 
in England. • • On the whole it is probable that tenancies subsist for 
longer periods under the year to year agreements than under leases for 
periods of years" ( p. 120) • 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that long occupancy always 
results in a feeling of secure tenure. Much depends upon the nature of 
the landlord and customary practice. When the landlord is a permanent 
estate consisting of many farms and has an established record of fair 
dealing with tenants, never putting them off except for failure to pay 
the rent or flagrant abuse of the property, the tenants are as likely to 
feel secure as if they had a long-term lease. But when the landlord owns 
only one or two farms, has little ability to deal with tenants, lacks 
financial security, is quite old and has heirs who cannot be expected to 
continue the lease, the short-term tenant will probably feel insecure. 
Under these circumstances even a long-term lease might not be of much 
help because the tenant may feel that the landlord will find a reason to 
break the lease if it is to his advantage to do so. As Thomas pointed 
out "all landlords were not good landlords, and a traditional system un­
trammeled with legal restrictions gave scope for the bad landlord as well 
as opportunity for the good landlord. In particular, the system suffered 
from three drawbacks known to students of the subject as the 'three F's' 
standing for the absence of fair rents, fixity of tenure and free sale.1110 
To make the general practice uniform, legislation was first adopted 
in 1851 which gave the tenant the right to remove certain improvements, 
provided he had received the written consent of the landlord before build­
ing them. In 1875 an Agricultural Holdings Act was adopted which permit­
ted the outgoing tenant to claim compensation for the unexhausted value 
of certain improvements that he had made, but the law could be, and often 
was, circumvented. In 1883 the provisions of the law were made compulsory 
so that all tenants when quitting a farm could claim compensation for the 
lOEdgar Thomas, "Tenure of Agricultural Land in Britain," Family 
Farm Policy, ed. Ackerman and Harris (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1947) , p. 165. 
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value of unexhausted improvements to an oncoming tenant.11 
Two goals, "fixity of tenure" and "freedom of c:ropping," were 
achieved in 1906 when Parliament passed an act which permitted the ten­
ant to claim compensation for unjustified di3turbance and gave him, sub­
ject to some restrictions, freedom to follow a eystem of farming of his 
own choosing. 
In 1920 the third goal, "fair rents," was largely achieved by an­
other act permitting the tenant to demand arbit:ration of the rent to be 
paid. If the landlord :refused to arbitrate, the tenant could leave the 
farm and claim compensation for unjustified distu:rbance just as if the 
landlord had given notice. This law also permitted the tenant to claim 
compensation for farming practices superior to those of the community. 
Parliament consolidated all these laws into the Agricultural Holdings 
Act of 1923. Further changes were made in the Agricultural Act of 1947 
and the tenure provisions were again consolidated in the Agricultural 
Holdings Act 1948, making "the once servile tenant into the spoilt darling 
of the legislature • • •  by putting land tenure on a basis which, in prac­
tice, made a solvent sitting tenant irremovable and kept rents substan­
tially below their open market level. Subsequent political trends made 
adjustments in favor of the agricultural landlord inevitable1 _
and the 
first installment was made in the Agricultural Act of 1958. nu 
Watson had earlier called attention to the fact "that the law has 
been repeatedly changed to the advantage of the tenant. It is no matter 
for surprise that the tenants now no longer ask for long leases; the 
common tenancy--which runs from year to year until one party or the other 
gives a year's notice to terminate--gives all the security that could be 
reasonably demanded. Again it is not surprising that British farmers 
(who, in general, have never had much ambition to own their fal'lllS) are 
now definitely adverse to ownership. A farmer will rarely buy if he can 
rent the kind of a farm he wants. The main anxiety now is whether the 
landlord will be able or willing, for the future to fulfill what a:re re­
garded as his normal responsibilities--the maintenance and modernization 
1�his and the following discussion of English laws is based on 
"Improvement of the Tenant Status in England," Farm Tenancy Report of 
the President's Committee (Washington, D. C. : U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1937), pp. 72-73. 
120. R. McGregor, "Agriculture in an Industrial Society," in Ernle, 
English Farming, Past� Present, 1961 (Chap. I.V of Introduction), 
p. cxliii. 
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when necessary of the farmhouse, hired men's house, barns, farm roadways 
and drainage systems.1113 
Thus the law which Walter Blith called for in 1652 was finally 
enacted in 1883, and in subsequent legislation the other F's have been 
fully achieved. Indeed they appear to have been over achieved so that 
the landlords, rather than the tenants, now have a serious tenure prob­
lem. Be that as it may, the passage of the tenancy legislation indicates 
that the four F's were major objectives or goals of farmers. 
III. The Four F's and Owner-Operation in the United States 
During the two centuries that the English tenant was acquiring the 
four F's, his cousin in America was achieving the four F's and more by 
fee simple ownership. The attempts to reproduce medieval feudalism in 
the New World by making large grants to royalty failed simply because 
land was too easily obtained in other ways. Therefore, men who ventured 
to the Colonies did not voluntarily settle on the feudal holdings that 
were set up. Attempts to collect quitrents also failed. Why would any­
one agree to pay such rents when land was almost free for the taking? 
Why would anyone become a tenant on unimproved land, then after clearing 
the wilderness lose or share the returns with a landlord who had contri­
buted little or nothing? 
Lands granted to the New England Colonies were in turn granted to 
groups of settlers who created townships and divided the land by lot 
according to need and productivity. This system was based on the English 
manorial system, but the manorial head was replaced by a democratic town 
government. Instead of rents, taxes were paid; no doubt the question of 
"fair taxes" replaced the question of "fair rents. " Because the settler 
had fixity of tenure, freedom of improvement, and freedom of cropping, 
the Old World problems did not arise.14 
The only fully developed manorial system arose in the middle colonies 
that later became New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Dela­
ware. This system was started by the Dutch in New York--especially along 
lJJames A. S. Watson, "Land Ownership, Farm Tenancy and Farm Labor 
in Britain," Agricultural History 17 (1943), p. 77. 
14E. E. Edwards, "American Agriculture--the First JOO Years" in 
Farmers in� Changin� World, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook 
of Agriculture (1940 , pp. 175-76; Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of 
the United States, 1785-1900 (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 195JJ:' 
p. 6. 
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the Hudson River--but these manors were al.most deserted when the British 
took over in 1664. The lands that are now New York, Pennsylvania and 
Delaware were granted to the Duke of York, a younger brother of the King. 
In 1680 the Duke leased Pennsylvania and Delaware to William Penn for 
10, 000 years. 
The Duke's effort to introduce the quitrents (cash payments as a 
substitute for labor on the Lord's holdings) was unpopular and poorly 
enforced. Nonetheless, quitrents continued to be a source of irritation, 
even violence, until the middle of the nineteenth century. Penn's efforts 
to establish manorial systems were somewhat more successful partially be­
cause the quitrents were only a penny an acre. The New England system 
and the headright system were also used and, of course, with virtually 
unlimited land available, these systems provided unbeatable competition 
for the manors. 
In Virginia a headright of 50 acres could be secured by anyone who 
"adventured" himself to the Colony. Soon this privilege was extended to 
every member of the family and finally to anyone who would pay one to five 
shillings for the right. The headright could be located on any available 
land, and of course, the best was chosen. At the beginning of the eight­
eenth century other methods of land disposal were used by the southern 
Colonies. Small grants with quitrents were used. Some groups of settlers 
established semi-autonomous communities known as "hundreds." 
The scarcity of labor also made it difficult for large landed estates 
to develop. At least four of five free white men in the Colonies were 
farmers on their own land. They were not interested in developing land 
for others. Only the introduction of Negro slaves made the large estates 
and plantations profitable and possible. These plantations resembled 
manors except that they were worked by slaves. Once created, they tended 
to be kept intact in Virginia by primogeniture and entails until 1776 
when Jefferson succeeded in changing these laws.15 
The abolition of primogeniture and entails, started by Jefferson in 
Virginia, soon spread to the other states. Both primogeniture and entails 
were prohibited by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which specified that 
property of all ttdying intestate, shal;l. descend to, and be distributed 
among th�ir children, and the descendants of a deceased child, in equal 
parts.nlb 
l5E. E. Edwards, Jefferson and Agriculture, U. S. Department of 
Agriculture Agricultural History Series no. 7 (1943), p. 54. 
16 H. S. Commager, Documents of American History, 5th ed. (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. , 19�), p. 128. 
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Although the outlawing of primogeniture and entails did not prevent 
estates being held together by will and trusts, the action clearly in­
dicates that the farmers of the time chose to solve the problems of the 
four F's not by long leases, compensatory clauses and legislation, but 
by ownership. Although the problems and goals were much the same, the 
English tenant took the road to tenancy improvement and his American 
cousin the road to ownership. 
If the manorial system had succeeded, the problems of the four F's 
probably would have been as severe in this country as in England. But 
the scarcity of labor and the abundance of land made the purchase of 
land for resale to farmers in fee simple a more attractive business than 
leasing. For the American farmer the major concern was with "fair sale" 
of land, fair credit terms, and eventually free land which gave him the 
remaining three F's--fixity of tenure, freedom of improvement and free­
dom of operation. 
Starting in 1787, one land credit scheme after another was tried 
and found wanting. By 1820 credit was abolished in favor of cash sales 
with a minimum price of $1.25 per acre. In 1841 the Preemption Act 
was passed which allowed those who settled on the public domain ahead 
of the surveys to have first opportunity to acquire title to 160 acres 
when it was offered for sale at the minimum price. In 1854 the Gradua­
tion Act provided that land which had been on the market 10 years could 
be sold for $1.00 an acre, 15 years for $.75, 20 years at $.50 and so 
on. Then in 1862, after a long struggle for "free land," the Homestead 
Act of that year virtually gave 160 acres of land to any settler after 
five years of residence or permitted him to commute this requirement 
by paying $1.25 to $2.50 per acre. The original Homestead Act was fol­
lowed by the Desert Land Act, the Timber Culture Act, and the Timber and 
Stone Act. All these acts made it possible for the settler to secure 
the additional land needed for an economic unit in the West. 
Unfortunately the settlers had to learn the hard way that free land 
was not inexhaustible and that what was free to one generation was cost­
ly for the next. As a result, farm tenancy increased from 25 percent 
in 1880, to 35 percent in 1900, and to 37 percent by 1910. Sharp in­
creases in land prices doubled the need for credit for land purchases, 
and agitation for more credit resulted in a return to governmental 
credit for farm ownership. Strong pressures resulted in the passage 
of the Federal Farm Loan Act in 1916, which established the Federal 
Land Banks. One of the strongest arguments for this Act was that it 
would give deserving tenants an opportunity to become owners; but from 
1917 to 1921 only 18 percent of the loans were used to purchase land, 
and the figure did not rise above 20 percent until 1937.17 
l7William G. Murray, "Governmental Farm Credit and Tenancy," Agri­
cultural Finance, 2nd ed. (Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1947), pp. 
341-2. 
9 
That farmers and their leaders were greatly concerned about the prob­
lem of maintaining the four F's by owner-operation is indicated by the 
number of States that enacted credit measures between 1913 and 1915. 
These were Massachusetts, Utah, Wisconsin, New York, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
Montana, Minnesota, and the.two Dakotas. 
The depression of the 1930s and the extensive farm-mortgage fore­
closures caused the federal government to pass the Emergency Farm Mort­
gage Act of 1933 which provided for Land Bank Commissioner Loans permit­
ting loans after 1945 up to 65 percent of the normal agricultural value 
of the farm. In 1937 Congress passed the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act 
which, according to Murray, "was a clear-cut mandate of Congress to use 
Government credit to aid tenants in purchasing farms" (p. 319). A unique 
feature was that these loans could be made for up to 100 percent of value 
of the farm as certified by a county committee of farmers. Lack of funds 
and the limitation of loans to farms of average size or smaller has kept 
the program from significantly affecting the farm-tenure situation, but 
its existence does emphasize the strong demand for the achievement of the 
four F's by owner-operation. 
IV. Landlord and Tenant Opinion Regarding the Four F's 
The evidence available from farm tenure survey$ leaves much to be 
desired. None of the studies reviewed below had as its sole objective 
the determination of what problems frustrate farmers. Indeed, in most, 
evidence of the nature of the problem is a side product of other purposes. 
Questions designed to determine a farmer's frustrations and the cause 
of those frustrations are difficult to construct. Even when· good ques­
tions have been designed, the farmer's answers will vary with his experi­
ence and intelligence. This is true because it is one thing to experience 
difficulty and be frustrated and quite another to be able to identify and 
express the cause of the difficulty. The survey results, however, do 
give some evidence of the nature of farm-tenure problems. 
That tenants want more fixity of tenure is suggested by their desire 
for longer-term leases even though the strength of this desire has not 
been satisfactorily measured. In Nebraska, Lambrecht and Wallin found 
that of .54 tenants interviewed, only 7 percent preferred one-year leases, 
whereas 17 percent preferred three to four-year leases and 76 percent, 
five-year leases. In contra�t, 70 percent of the landlords interviewed 
preferred a one-year lease.l� 
18G . H. Lambrecht and L. w. Wallin, Farm Tenancy in Box Butte Co)ty, 
Nebraska, Nebraska Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 336 (1942 , 
pp. 23-24 and Table 19. 
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Similar results were secured when 90 central South Dakota tenants 
were asked (1) "What is the length of your present lease?" and (2) "What 
length of lease do you prefer?" Although 95 percent had one-year or year­
to-year leases, 66 percent preferred three-year terms or longer, and 35 
percent five-year terms or longer.19 These answers were in sharp contrast 
to replies from 267 South Dakota landlords. Of these, 83 percent used a 
one-year lease and 78 percent said they preferred the short term (p. 6). 
In 1961, questionnaires were sent to 250 landlords and 500 tenants in 
Brookings County, South Dakota. Replies were received from 85 landlords 
and 130 tenants. Only 53 percent of these landlords said that they be­
lieved long-term leases should be made, whereas 84 percent of the tenants 
preferred long terms. It is also possible that some of the landlords who 
said they favored long terms may have confused long terms with long occu­
pancy, which they favor--provided a good job of farming is done and a fair 
rent is paid. In any event, the difference in opinion is still consider­
able. 20 
Tenants seem to feel fairly confident of long occupancy--perhaps 
believing that they can keep the landlord satisfied that they are doing 
a good job and paying a fair rent. For example, 60 percent of the ten­
ants in Moody County, South Dakota, said they felt they had 10 chances 
out of 10 of keeping their present farms for the next 5 years, even though 
many of these tenants had one-year leases and preferred longer terms. 
Only 26 percent said they had a 50-50 chance or less of keeping the farm 
for the next five years. Moreover, only 17 percent thought that a five­
year lease would increase their chances of keeping the farm for the next 
five years. The rest (83 percent) thought it would not make much differ­
ence.21 
Why then do tenants prefer longer-term leases? A possible answer 
is that they want more freedom of operation or management than they have 
under short terms. If this is true, why do farm landlords resist the 
tenants' desire for more freedom and independence? Asked why the short­
term lease was customarily used, 65 percent of 267 South Dakota landlords 
l9R. L. Berry, Share Rents and Short-Term Farm Leases, South Dakota 
Agricultural Experiment Station Circular 1171'1955), p. 5, Tables 1 and 3. 
20 R. L. Berry, Farm Tenancy Problems in South Dakota, South Dakota 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 510 (1963), Table 21, fourth 
question. 
21R. L. Berry and V. E. Bau, Tenant Interest in Long Term Cash and 
Flexible Cash Leases, South Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station 
Bulletin 480 (1959), p. 16, Tables 9 and 10. 
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replying chose the statement, "Because the short-term lease keeps the 
tenant on his toes since he knows you can get another tenant if he does 
a poor job.1122 In the 1961 study, 67 percent of the landlords and 77 
percent of the tenants indicated that they believed the following state­
ment was true: "The main reason why the short-term lease is customarily 
used is to make sure that the tenant does a good job of farming and pays 
a fair share as rent. 1123 
Because the share-rent lease was being used by almost all of these 
landlords, it is not difficult to understand the reluctance to grant long­
term leases that would permit tenants to farm in a way that might serious­
ly reduce rents. After all, the short term is the landlord's best insur­
ance against a tenant who does a poor job and pays a poor rent. 
v. Land-Tenure Research Workers and the Four F's 
Although research bulletins on farm tenancy between 1910 and 1945 
had little to say about tenure problems and goals, some special reports 
and journal articles were beginning to discuss them. 
In 1937 the President's Committee recognized ownership as the his­
toric means of achieving security rather than being an end or goal in 
itself. Therefore, it urged not only more credit for ownership but also 
legislation similar to that in England to give the tenant more security 
of tenure and more freedom of improvement. Security of tenure and free­
dom of improvement thus appear to be the immediate goals sought. Stabil­
ity of rural life, soil conservation, conservation of levels of living, 
and economic stability and security, however, were also discussed. It is 
not clear whether these latter were regarded as tenure goals or as general 
goals of society that were only incidentally related to tenure.24 
22 Berry, Share Rents, pp. 10-13, Table 7. The other alternatives 
listed were: (A) Because long-term leases are not as binding on tenants 
as they are on landlords, (B) Because the one-year lease gives the land­
lord a chance to increase the rent as his expenses rise, (C) quoted 
above, (D) Other. An open-end pretest indicated that these answers were 
the most popular. 
23Berry, Farm Tenancy Problems, Table 21, last question. 
24Report of the President's Committee, Farm Tenancy (Washington, 
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937;:-pp. 9-18. 
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Henry C. Taylor, a member of the President's Committee, pointed out 
that fair rent, security of tenure, and freedom of operation were goals 
of the past and raised the question as to what degree these should be 
sacrificed to achieve other goals of society. 25 
Maddox listed four outstanding goals of the major national programs. 
One of these was "security, opportunity and personal integrity of nonland­
owning agriculturalists, such as tenants and farm laborers. " Another was 
to maintain owner-operation. Whether the security ref erred to is economic 
or tenure-related was not made clear. 26 Much clearer was Schickele's 
statement that "security of tenure and opportunity to exercise initiative 
and develop managerial competence on the part of the tenant are corner­
stones of an efficient tenancy system which are deplorably lacking in the 
corn belt. " To achieve these objectives, compensation for the tenant's 
unexhausted improvements and automatic continuation clauses with longer­
term notices were recommended for study. 27 
In contrast, Wiley believed that the tenure problem was one of in­
creasing the farmer's equity whether he be a tenant or an owner. Larger 
farms and greater efficiency thus were regarded as means to greater equity. 
Nonetheless he called for improvements in landlord-tenant relationships, 
"thereby leading to greater security of tenure. 1128 
Brandt said our society calls for a tenure system that will foster 
economic efficiency in such a way that an optimum of creativity, and 
individual freedom and security can be attained. "Greater security of 
tenure and compensation for improvements promises to assimilate the func­
tioning of tenancy to that of owner operation and to lead to longer occu­
pancy, more conservationist husbandry and improvement in durable land 
improvements. The social and professional standards of tenants will grad­
ually be raised • • • • 1129 
25H. C. Taylor, "Land Tenure and Social Control of the Use of Land" 
in Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Agricultural Econ­
omists (1938 pp. 140-165. 
26 J. G. Maddox, "Land Tenure Research in a National Land Policy, " 
Journal of Farm Economics 19, no. 1 (1937), p. 106. 
27Rainer Schickele, "Tenure Problems and Research Needs in the Middle 
West, " Journal of Farm Economics 19, no. 1 (1937), pp. 118-22. 
28c. A. Wiley, "Tenure Problems and Research Needs in the South, " 
Journal of Farm Economics 19, no. 1 (1937), pp. 133, 138. 
29Karl Brandt, "Toward a More Adequate Approach to the Farm Tenure 
Program, " Journal of Farm Economics 24, no. 1 (1942), pp. 208, 225. 
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To Hoffsommer, control in tenure relations is more fundamental than 
security of tenure. "Control implies the ability to do what one wants to 
do--to be either venturesome or conservative," he declared.JO Thus control 
implies freedom of short-run operation and long-run improvement. Without 
security of tenure, such control or freedom is not likely to exist. 
Although Hammar disagreed with Brandt about the importance of the 
tenure problem, he did little to clarify the point. He decried the land­
tenure ideal or goal of owner-operation and argued that if efficiency in 
the use of human resources were achieved, the tenure problem would largely 
solve itself . 31 
In 1943 Timmons stressed the importance of distinguishing between 
ends and means in farm-tenure goals. He declared that "the following six 
goals • • • are posed as the ends of tenure policy towards which means 







Freedom to develop one's resources and to realize his inalien­
able rights to life, liberty and happiness. 
Widely distributed rights in land (control over land resources) 
to provide the physical resources with which to work and enjoy 
life. 
Security in the future possession of present landed rights. 
Stability of rural institutions including the school, church 
and local government. 
Efficiency of production directed towards the maximization of 
the produce from the resources in which rights are held. 
Conservation of resources in which rights are held or over which 
control is ex;t:"cised.1132 
JOHarold Hoffsommer, "Progress of Tenure Groups," Journal of Farm 
Economics 23, no. 1 (1941), p. 210. 
JlConrad H. Hammar, "The Land Tenure Ideal," Journal of Land and 
Public Utility Economics 19, no. 1 (1943), pp. 78-81. 
- -- -
32John F. Timmons, "Land Tenure Policy Goals," Journal of Land and 
Public Utility Economics 19, no. 1 (1943), pp. 167-79. 
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When the North Central Land Tenure Research Committee reviewed avail­
able research data the following year, it concluded that (1) adequate farm 
income, (2) security of tenure and (3) opportunity for personal and com­
munity development were necessary objectives, or goals, that were basic 
to constructive tenure policies.33 
In the same year a committee of the Association of Land Grant Colleges 
and Universities agreed that owner-operation should remain the tenure 
pattern, but concluded that "the farmer's security and freedom in the use 
of land and his share in farm income are o�1,more significance than whether he is called an owner, tenant or laborer.11..rr 
In 1945, the U. S. Department of Agriculture declared that "public 
policy ought to encourage the development of owner-operated family farms 









An equitable distribution of farm income. 
Conservation and development of farm land and buildings. 
Effective farm work and efficient production • • • • • 
Wide distribution of the control over farm land • 
Maximum freedom of action for individuals • • • . . 
Equality of opportunity, dignity, and self respect for all 
tenure groups. 
Reasonable security for the individual in his possession of 
rights in land. 
A wholesome, well-integrated and stable community.1135 
33North Central Land Tenure Research Committee, Improving Farm 
Tenure in the Midwest (North Central Regional Publication no. 2;;-r11inois 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 502 (1944), pp. 146-49. 
J4Postwar Agri cultural Policy, Association of Land Grant Colleges 
and Universities (1944), pp. 30-31. 
35Farm Tenure Improvement in the United States, u. s. Department of 
Agriculture Interbureau Committee on Postwar Programs, mimeographed 
preliminary (1945), p. 56. 
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One year later the land tenure committee of the Northern Great Plains 
Agricultural Advisory Committee accepted (1) adequate income, (2) security 
of tenure, (3) stability of rural life, (4) land conservation and develop­
ment, and (5) more owner operation as "an effective means of furthering 
other tenure objectives.1136 . 
At the International Conference on Family Farms held in Chicago in 
1946, Belshaw declared that a desirable tenure system should 
(1) prevent waste or encourage conservation, 
(2) provide the opportunity or freedom of farming and improvement, 
(3) encourage efficient sized farms, 
(4) encourage entry of well-qualified farmers regardless of their 
capital, 
(5) provide security of tenure, 
(6) avoid speculative booms and bursts in land prices, 
(?) encourage wage rates comparable to other occupations, and 
(8) increase stability of net income.37 
At the same conference a committee chaired by E. B. Hill, on the 
"Place of Ownership and Tenancy," declared that "the weak spots in farm 
tenancy • • •  are (a) insecurity of tenure; (b) inadequate farms--farms 
too small, soil productivity low, farm improvements not maintained; (c) 
lack of managerial control by the tenant; (d) incompetent management; 
(e) inadequate family incomes; (f) poor housing; (g) lack of tenant par­
ticipation in community affairs; (h) lack of reimbursement for improve­
ments made and for damage done by the tenant.1138 
36rmproving Farm and Ranch Tenure in the Northern Plains, Northern 
Great Plains Agricultural Advisory Council Report 1, Montana Agricultural 
Experiment Station Bulletin 436 (1946), pp. 4-5. 
37Horace Belshaw, "Land Tenure and the Problem of Tenure Reform in 
New Zealand," Family Farm Policl6 ed. Ackerman and Harris (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 19 ), pp. 193-99. 
38E. B. Hill and others, Family Farm Policy, p. 425. 
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Another committee, chaired by Hoffsommer on "Measures to Improve 
Tenure Conditions of Family Farms," listed as problems "(l) security and 
stability of occupancy, (2) conservation and improvement of farming, (3) 
structural improvements and other provisions for tenants, (4) rental 
rates, and (5) cooperation between owner and tenant. 1139 
A third committee on "Government and Tenure Improvement," chaired 
by Benedict, found that legislation was needed to 
(1) Compensate the tenant for the value of his unexhausted improve­
ments and penalize him for his waste, damages, or failure to 
meet other obligations. 
(2) Provide security of tenure through automatic renewal and 
compensation for unjustified disturbance. 
(3) Provide reasonable freedom of cropping. 
(4) Protect the tenant against excessive rentals. 
(5) Provide adequate housing. 40 
Harris and Ackerman summarized the goals of Belshaw and the com­
mittees of the conference in twelve points, but in discussing farm ten­
ancy they said, "lack of managerial control on the part of the tenant 
is a major shortcoming everywhere, although admittedly more pronounced 
in some places than others. This has an adverse effect upon securing 
maximum production efficiency for the tenant is not free to choose a 
balanced combination of enterprises, he is handicapped in the develop­
ment of livestock, and his short-time viewpoint forces him to have little 
concern about planning crop rotations and following conservational 
practices • • • where the tenant is not assured of occupancy long enough 
to get the benefit from capital developments or where he has no right 
of compensation for improvements when he leaves the farm," he is afraid 
to improve for fear of losing the farm or being charged a higher 
rental. 41 
39H. Hoffsommer and others, Family Farm Policy, p. 441. 
40Murray R. Benedict and others, Family Farm Policy, pp. 488-89. 
4�arshall Harris and Joseph Ackerman, "Interpretive Summary of 
the Conference," Family Farm Policy, pp. 25-26. 
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Harris listed the following tenure objectives or goals at the 
Caribbean Land Tenure Symposium in 1946 : 
1. Responsible freedom of personal action. 
2.  F,quality and dignity of all tenure groups . 
3 .  Secure possession of rights in land. 
4. Equitable distribution of rights in property. 
5 .  Conservation and development of physical resources . 
6. Highly efficient utilization of productive resources. 
7. F,quitable distribution of income. 
8 .  Well integrated community life.42 
A year after the International Farm Family Conference, Heady wrote 
an article on leasing which appeared to question most of the problems 
and goal� developed by the conference.43 To Heady the major problem of 
society, and certainly of agriculture, is inefficiency. He cited im­
perfect leasing systems as one cause of agricultural inefficiency and 
formulated rules to overcome the imperfections . These rules were in­
tended to provide the tenant with freedom to allocate resources as 
prices and costs direct in the interest of greater efficiency. 
That the lack of the four F ' s  may not affect efficiency was indi­
cated by several studies which compared share tenants and owner­
operators . Little or no evidence was found that share tenants farmed 
less efficiently than did owners .44 
4�rshall Harris, "Objectives of Land Tenure Policy,"  Readings 
,2!! Agricultural Policy, ed. O.  B. Jesness (Philadelphia : Blakiston Co . ,  1949) , p .  383. Reprinted from Caribbean Land Tenure Symposium, Carib­
bean Commission (Trinidad, 1946), pp. 30-48 . 
43Earl O. Heady, "Economics of Farm Leasing Systems,"  Journal of 
Farm Economics 29 , no. 3 (1947) . This article was later slightly � 
revised and republished as Chap. 20 in his Economics of Agricultural 
Production and Resource Use (New York : Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1952). 
44see D .  Gale Johnson, "Resource Allocation Under Share Contracts , "  
Journal of Political Economics 58 (April 1950) ,  p .  118. (His evidence 
consisted mainly of a comparison of net cash and net share rents from 
1925 to 1946 . ) ; E.  O.  Heady and Earl W. Kehrberg, Relationship of Crop­
Share and Cash Leasing Systems to Farming Efficien�, Iowa Agricultural 
Experiment Station Bulletin 386 (1952), pp . 635 ,  6�; Walter G.  Miller, 
Walter E. Chryst and Howard W. Ottoson, Relative Efficiencies of Farm 
Tenure Classes in Intra Firm Resource Allocation (North Centra"l"°Region­
al Publication 84) Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulle­
tin 461 ( 1958) , pp. 334-5 ; and W. L. Gibson, Jr. , Renting Farms in 
Southside Virginia, (Southeast Land Tenure Research Commission Publica­
tion 38), Virginia Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 523 (1961) , 
pp. 30-34. 
18 
Contrary to his expectations , Sanderson found that in the adjoining 
deep loess areas of Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska and Kansas, crop-share ten­
ants were more efficient crop producers than either owner-operators or 
livestock-share tenants. In overall efficiency, however , livestock-share 
tenants excelled, whereas thare was little difference between crop-share tenants and owner-operators . 5 
In the same soil area of Nebraska, Neuman and Ottoson found that share 
tenants used less inputs per acre than either owner-operators or livestock­
share tenants, but that crop-share farmers made about $1,200 more net f�m income than owner-operators and $1,200 less than livestock-share farms. 
Barlowe noted that although emphasis on goals has changed with time , 
the central core of these goals has been the desire for 
( 1) a wide distribution of property rights , 
( 2) opportunity for every man to manage his business, 
( J) adequate sized farms , 
( 4) efficient use of land over time, and 
( 5) maximum security and stability of possession consistent with 
good management.47 
These may appear to be different from the four F's, but they are not . 
Item 1 has been achieved by the equivalent of "fair rents, "  i . e .  "fair 
sale , "  by the government homestead laws and by fair credit terms . Item 
2 is obviously the same as freedom of operation. Item J calls for free­
dom to enlarge the farm, an improvement comparable to enlarging the barn 
or introducing irrigation. Item 4 asks for freedom to improve over time , 
and Item 5 asks for fixity or security of tenure. 
45John T. Sanderson, "Relative Efficiency of Alternative Tenure 
Arrangements" (M. S.  thesis , Iowa State University , 1960) , pp . 71, 139 
and Table 12; or see Virgil L .  Hurlburt, Use of Farm Resources as Condi­
tioned .£y Tenure Arrangements ( North Central Regional Publication 151), 
Nebraska Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 215 ( 1964) 
which slllTlITlarizes Sanderson' s  work , p.  15 and Table lJ. 
46nuane F. Neuman and Howard Ottoson, � of Tenure, Organization 
and Resource Use on Farms in Southeast Nebraska , Nebraska Agricultural 
Experiment Statiorl"Agricultural Economics Report J2 (1964) , p.  iii. 
47Raleigh Barlowe , Land Resource Economics (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J . : Prentice-Hall , Inc. , 1958), p.  435. 
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As mentioned above, the Interregional Land Tenure Research Committee, 
in its "Gray Report, " held that "the functions of tenure arrangements 
be come the creation of ne cessary incentives and means conducive to : (1) 
efficient resource use, (2) stability of resource productivity and (J )  
equality of a ccess to resources among individuals" (p. 2). The inter­
pretation usually placed on these three items is that they are tenure 
goals. Yet it appears that the three F's--fixity of tenure, freedom to 
improve, and freedom to operate--may be more immediate goals . The report 
declares that the debt-free full owner "has the greatest freedom to or­
ganize his resources and has maxi.mum security of tenure expectations . 
The debt-free full owner can choose investments (enterprises) that will 
yield the greatest return over time with assurance that his length of 
tenure will permit his gaining the returns from these investments . Sim­
ilarly, he is not affected by the dissociation of costs and returns be­
tween individuals . The full owner can supply as much of each factor as 
is economically feasible, knowing that he will receive the full return 
from every unit employed, whereas the tenant can employ resources only to 
the point where the last unit employed is equal to his share of the addi­
tional returns produced" ( p. 9). 
This quotation, and the dis cussion that follows concerning mortgaged 
owner-operators and tenants, make it clear that for these two groups the 
a cquisition of more of the security of tenure and freedom of operation and 
improvement en joyed by full owners is the immediate goal of research ac­
tivity which perfect market theory suggests should result in greater effi­
cien cy. In essence then, the argument is the same as Heady's, and analysis 
suggests that fixity of tenure, freedom of improvement,and freedom of 
operation are the recognized immediate tenure goals. 
How helpful are goals of efficien cy, equality and stability as guides 
in giving farmers more security and freedom? One can only agree with 
Ottoson, Wunderlich and Diesslin that they "are so general, so obscure, 
that they are of little help empirically.1148 Nonetheless, the word effi­
cien cy appears frequently in their discussion of the 26 areas of land­
tenure research. Efficien cy, equality and stability are mentioned as 
objectives of research on getting started in farming. "Achieving Effi­
ciency in Agricultural Land Use" is the first area dis cussed . Under this 
heading the authors say, "Tenure arrangements will obstruct efficiency if 
they do not en courage enlargement of farms to meet technological changes; 
do not give security of tenure that will lead to adoption of effective 
long range farm plans and improved farming practi ces; and do not give a 
fair division of costs and returns between the individuals involved" 
(p . 4). 
48 Howard W .  Ottoson, Gene Wunderlich, and Howard G. Diesslin, Land 
Tenure Research, Scope and Nature, p. J .  
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Efficiency still appears to be the main objective, but sub-objectives 
appear to be fixity or security of tenure, freedom to improve by enlarging 
the farm, freedom to adopt other long range plans and improved practices, 
and determination of " the elements in the market situation that cause land 
prices, whether the use price in rental or value in transfer of ownership, 
to fail to reflect properly the productivity of land"--in short, fair 
rents or fair prices. 
In discussing leasing arrangements (p. 8) the authors note that prob­
lems are created (1) when costs are not shared as the product is shared, 
(2) when discriminatory rents are charged, and (3) when short terms create 
insecure tenure. As the discussion of Heady's rules pointed out, the four 
F's are implied as objectives by these problems. Whether the achievement 
of these goals will result in greater efficiency is perhaps beside the 
point, unless one is willing to say that people should endure arry frustra­
tion that does not affect efficiency--or a sore should not be of concern, 
no matter how irritating, unless it affects one's efficiency. 
The views expressed in the 22 works published between 1936 and 1962 
can be summarized: 
Problems, objectives, goals £!:_ incentives 
Fixity or security of tenure 
Freedom of improvement or long-run management 
Freedom of operation or short-run management 
Fair or equitable rents 
Economic efficiency 
Opportunity or equality (various meanings) 
Soil conservation (improvement? ) 
Stability of rural institutions 













There seems to be general agreement among these research workers 
that the first four items--the four F's--are important aspects of tenure 
that should receive attention because their lack constitutes a problem ; 
and the goal or objective should be to provide them, if only as an 
" incentive" to greater efficiency--the fourth-ranked problem or goal. 
A capitalistic, free enterprise society is founded on the notion that 
the greatest efficiency results when private firms have freedom to allocate 
their resources as costs and prices direct. To the extent that the four 
F's give farmers this freedom, it is logical to believe that efficiency 
may be increased. The fact that increased efficiency has not been 
found in several empirical comparisons of owner-operators, cash tenants 
and share-rent tenants, does not weaken the logic. Rather, it suggests 
that there may be other reasons for lack of arry difference--custom, lease 
provision, or fear of losing the farm. But these studies do raise the 
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question of whether lack of efficiency is a tenure problem and whether its 
removal is a meaningful tenure objective or goal. If an automobile engine 
stalls,  the problem is not one of miles per gallon of fuel, or efficiency. 
More likely, it is a problem of ignition or fuel supply to the engine . 
The precise problem--theref 0re the precise objective of the mechanic--is 
a matter to be determined rather than assumed. 
Opportunity as a goal seems to have no generally accepted meaning . 
Sometimes it refers to opportunity to acquire fixity of tenure ,  sometimes 
to opportunity to manage the business.  In either case it appears to be a 
synonym for one or more of the four F ' s .  
Soil conservation as a goal suggests that farmers should have free­
dom to conserve as well as to improve . (These freedoms do not necessarily 
imply freedom to waste . )  Ownership is one means of acquiring the four F ' s  
that i s  justly popular with farmers . Stability of rural institutions 
seems to be closely related to fixity of tenure. Finally, economic stabil­
ity, like economic efficiency, does not appear to be a tenure problem but 
a problem of society as a whole . 
VI . Farm-Tenure Goals of Landlords 
Historically, the four F ' s  have been stated from the tenant ' s  view­
point, and this view has been accepted. Yet if these tenure goals are to 
be achieved, they must also be attractive to farm landlords . This is 
true because in the United States the farm landlord is generally in a 
stronger bargaining position than is the tenant, especially when the land­
lord has a productive farm attractive to many land-hungry tenant s .  Unless 
the farm landlord can more easily achieve his goals , he is not likely to 
give the tenant either greater fixity of tenure or freedom of operation 
or improvement. 
What, then, are the landlord' s  goals? Perhaps what is desired is 
an ideal lease that would give the landlord security as to the amount of 
rent, security as to the payment of the rent, and security as to the pro­
ductivity of his property or reversionary interest. Stated from a differ­
ent standpoint--the landlord wants freedom from poor farming, poor rents 
and poor upkeep of the farm. 
What are the logical or theoretical reasons for believing that these 
hypothetical problems and goals of landlords may be valid? First, a land­
owner who proposes to lease his farm is obviously not interested in farm­
ing it himself . Nor is he interested in selling the farm. If he had 
this in mind, his main problem or goal would be to get a fair price. 
Once the price was paid, he would probably have no further economic prob­
lems or objectives with regard to this farm except what any citizen might 
have or as a matter of sentimental attachment. 
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If the landowner were to accept a partial payment of JO percent or 
more and a note secured by a mortgage for the balance , his concern 
would be great. He would want to be reasonably sure that the new owner 
could farm well enough to make the payments as scheduled. In the event 
of default, the mortgage holder would want to be sure that the value of 
the property had been maintained sufficiently so that it would be worth 
the unpaid balance in the event that he were compelled to foreclose. 
Because such risk would be small, this is not usually a serious problem. 
However, if the landowner is selling on a land contract with perhaps a 
10 percent down payment, he is likely to be more concerned about whether 
the buyer is a good farmer �ho will maintain or improve the farm, cul­
tivate it properly, and make payments on time. Failure to maintain the 
farm or to make the payments could result in a serious loss for the 
seller. 
If the landowner is interested in leasing the land--that is ,  in 
selling only the possession, use, and enjoyment of his land for a 
definite term in exchange for a rent--he is certainly interested-in 
getting a good "buyer" or tenant. If a fixed cash rent is to be paid, 
the landlord' s  main concern will be security of rent, of payment, and 
security of the productivity of his property. 
If the rent is an objectively determined flexible cash rent, 
which neither tenant nor landlord can affect after the lease is signed, 
the degree of concern remains much the same as in the fixed cash rent. 
Because the tenant can have a serious effect upon the landlord ' s  rever­
sionary estate , the landlord is much more concerned in getting and 
keeping a good farmer than he would be were he selling the land under 
any of the methods discussed above . 
When the landlord elects to lease for a crop-share, the tenant be­
comes even more important. If he can get and keep a good tenant , he 
is assured a good job of improvement, a good job of management , and a 
fair share as rent . The problem is that frequently the tenant is 
deficient in one or more of these aspects . Hence the share landlord 
lacks (1) security as to the amount of rent, (2) security of rent pay­
ment and ( 3) security of his property. Cash rents eliminate the first 
of these problems but not the last two.  
Because the share landlord is  uncertain about rent, he may, and 
often does,  specify in detail the crops to be grown, their acres ,  the 
variety of seed to be used, the kind and amount of fertilizers to be 
applied, the weed, insect and disease controls to be used and so on. 
Such activities on the part of the landlord--and the hiring of pro­
fessional farm managers--are evidence of the importance of these prob­
lems and goals under share-rent leases. 
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Some landowners ,  however , are not interested in selling either their 
freehold or their leasehold. What they are interested in is either some 
kind of a partnership or an employer-employee relationship. Under some 
partnerships each party owns the same share of all resources. Other part­
nerships are less clear. O� these the livestock-share lease is an example. 
Often one party owns all the land and buildings and half the livestock 
while the other party furnishes all the power, machinery, labor and half 
the livestock ; all costs and returns are shared equally. Whether this is 
a legal partnership is debatable, but certainly it must be at least a 
quasi-partnership, otherwise it would not seem so necessary to stress that 
it is a lease and that no partnership is intended. 
When the crop-share landlord feels that it is necessary to dictate 
the farming plans in the detail suggested above, the result can only be a 
kind of quasi-partnership which differs from the livestock-share lease 
mainly in that the livestock is not shared. If ,  as sometimes happens ,  the 
landlord exercises full control over the farming plans ,  the tenant may be 
only slightly different from the sharecropper of the cotton and tobacco 
plantations of the South or the metayer in Europe. Finally, there are 
those landowners who hire a working manager to carry out plans for the 
operation of the farm. The relationship here is that of employer-employee. 
Unfortunately, the distinction between a leasehold and a partnership is 
not clear. This leads to much confusion. Does the landowner want a ten­
ant, an employee, or both? If he wants a tenant, then it appears that his 
problems are likely to be insecurity as to the amount of rent, insecurity 
as to the payment of rent, and insecurity as to the maintenance of his 
property. Therefore , his major goals would be to achieve security of rent 
and property. 
Empirical evidence supports the theory that landlords are primarily 
concerned about the amount of rent, the payment of their rent, and the 
protection of the property. For example, Pond asked 3 , 300 randomly 
selected Minnesota landlords why their last tenant moved ;49 the 22 per­
cent who replied gave the following reasons : 
1. Tenant moved to ( a) a better farm 
( b) a purchased farm 
( c) other work or retirement 
( d) illness or death 
2. Tenant was unsatisfactory 
3. Tenant failed to pay rent 













49George A. Pond, Farm Tenancy in Minnesota , Minnesota Agricultural 
Experiment Station Bulletin 353 (194IT, p. 40. 
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Landlord concern with good farming and fair rents is indicated by the 
fact that 41 percent of the tenants moved for these reasons ( Items 2 and 
3). 
In Illinois, farm landlords attending county extension meetings chose 
6 items from a list of 18 tenant characteristics . 50 The most popular 
choices and the percentage choosing each were as follows :  
1.  Tenant with adequate power and machinery 
2.  Tenant who will help build up farm 
3. Tenant who is willing to work 
4. Tenant who keeps up with new ideas 
5. Tenant to make small repairs and keep place neat 
6 .  Timely planting and harvesting 
7 .  Fair sharing of costs 
8. Clean attractive farm 
9 .  Written lease 
10 . Cooperative planning 













The importance of good farming and hence good share rent is indicated by 
Items 1-4 and 6. The importance of maintaining the property is indicated 
by Items 5 and 8 .  
In contrast, Illinois farm tenants who attended the same meetings 
indicated the following preferences: 
Productive farm 
Landlord willing to make improvements 
Adequate buildings 
Modern house 
Lease longer than one year 
Written lease 
Fair sharing of costs 
Landlord willing to try new ideas 
Courteous and respectful treatment 
Appreciation for extra work done 













Thus if landlords want good farmers, they need productive, well-improved 
farms and must provide some security of tenure, freedom to improve, free­
dom to operate, and fair sharing of costs. 
50Franklin J .  Reiss, "What Do Tenants and Landlords Want," Farm Man­
agement Facts and Opinions to Help You, Newsletter no. 82 (21 February 
1965). 
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In South Dakota, a mail questionnaire was sent to 1,200 randomly 
chosen landlords. 51 Of the 317 who replied, 103 said that their previous 
tenant left at their request. The reasons given for requesting that the 












In Oklahoma, several hundred farm landlords who attended farm land­
lord-tenant hearings in 1938 gave these reasons why tenants move :52 
Poor farming 
To get better farm 
Poor income 










Division of crops 
Indefinite agreements 






These landlords also said that when they selected tenants they looked 
Power and equipment 
Honesty and dependability 
Good past record 
Good worker 






52 11Farm Landlord-Tenant Hearings," Oklahoma Extension Service, 
mimeographed (1938), p. 5. 
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In contrast, tenants said that they looked for these characteristics 
in selecting a landlord: 
Better land 
Better improvements 







In Iowa , Timmons asked 145 tenants and 131 landlords what they looked 
for in each other. 53 Their replies were : 
Ability to cooperate and get along 




















Again good farming and fair rents are suggested as the main goals by the 
replies of these landlords. 
Farm lease forms are also an indication of what landlords want since 
commercial forms are almost always prepared for landlords rather than ten­
ants. Some of these forms merely say that the tenant will farm as the 
landlord directs and some say that farming plans shall be made jointly. 
Others such as the model " Crop-Share-Cash Farm Lease" (AD561, March 1960), 
prepared and distributed by the U. S. Department of Agriculture, provide 
much space to specify the crops , the acres of each crop, the location of 
the crop, the seed variety, the kind and amount of fertilizer to be used 
and many other provisions. Commercial lease forms and many forms distri­
buted by State extension services contain liens on the tenant ' s  crops to 
guarantee the payment of the rent. A one-year or year-to-year term is 
al.most invariably used to insure a good job of farming , a fair rent, pay­
ment of the rent and upkeep of the property. 
Both the logic and the survey results ( sketchy though they are) 
suggest that landlord and tenant goals may be complementary in many cases.  
Landlords want to get and keep good tenants who can and will take care of 
53John F.  Timmons, Improving Farm Rental Arrangements in Iowa, Iowa 
Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 393 (1953J:" p. 83 . 
27 
minor repairs and upkeep problems , do a good job of farming and pay a fair 
rent. Tenants want to get and keep good farms on which they can make 
improvements ,  do a good job of farming as they see it and likewise pay a 
fair rent. Thus it seems that there would be much less leasing were it 
not for the mutual or complementary goals achieved by leasing. 
There are of course, many exceptions . Not all land.owners and farmers 
would agree to these goals . Some landowners are definitely interested in 
keeping the management of the farm largely in their own hands and prefer 
to treat their tenants as partners or employees rather than as independent 
contractors. Sharecropping in the South is an example , but some share­
rent leases are little better . Still other landlords tend to think of 
their tenants as partners in which both improvement and operation are joint 
responsibilities, as is usually the case under share-rent agreements.  But 
even here many share-rent landlords are content to leave most of these 
problems to the tenant, reserving by means of the short-term lease the 
right to remove him if he does a poor job or fails to pay a fair rent. 
The evidence suggests that the latter class includes many landlords 
who would heartily subscribe to the four goals. Certainly they are 
interested in getting and keeping good tenants for the very reason that 
they do not want to be concerned or bothered with problems of improvements ,  
day-to-day management , and doubts about the fairness of the rent. But 
because the share tenant' s  management does affect the rent, the land.lord 
often finds himself involved in the tenant' s  farming plans , worried about 
the amount of the rent, and using the short term to protect himself 
against flagrant abuse. Because the short term limits the tenant ' s  secur­
ity of tenure ,  it also limits his freedom to improve . 
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to determine if possible the major 
farm tenure problems and goals of both landlords and tenants . Evidence 
from English and American history, from tenure studies and from farm 
tenure research workers was examined. 
English history reveals that the four F' s were the relevant tenure 
goals that were finally made uniform by tenancy legislation after at 
least two centuries of effort. Today the English tenant has great secur­
ity of tenure, freedom of improvement, freedom of cropping and full 
opportunity to seek adjustment of rents that he deems unfair. There can 
be no doubt as to the objectives sought because they are incorporated in 
the law for all to see. They may have achieved too well for the future 
of the leasing system, a further indication of the strength of these 
tenure goals--the four F ' s .  
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The American colonists were also interested in the four F ' s ,  but the 
abundance of raw land and the scarcity of labor made it possible for them 
to achieve their objective by fee-simple ownership. Investors found that 
there was more money in buying large blocks of land, subdividing and 
selling it to settlers than in holding it for leasing as was done in Eng­
land. 
Ownership, hence the four F ' s ,  was easily achieved in part because 
Congress passed numerous credit acts, the Graduation Act, the Preemption 
Act, the various homestead acts ;  and it created the Federal Land Bank 
system and the Farmers Home Administration, both intended to make owner­
operators out of tenants . 
Despite all efforts at increasing owner-operation, farm tenancy has 
increased to the point where more than 50 percent of the land in much of 
the Corn Belt is now under lease. In some areas it is as high as 75 per­
cent . What do the landlords and tenants say that their major tenure 
problems are? Such evidence as is available indicates that the most 
important problems are the lack of the four F ' s--fixity of tenure ,  free­
dom to improve, freedom to operate , and fair rents. 
Land-tenure research workers also seem to be in general agreement 
that lack of the four F ' s  constitutes the major tenure problem. In 
recent years there has been much talk about efficiency, stability and 
equality as social goals which tenure arrangements should achieve . How­
ever , an examination of the proposed arrangements reveals that they would 
give the tenant fixity of tenure, by one means or another ; freedom to 
improve by compensating him for the value of his unexhausted improvements ; 
and freedom of operation by eliminating discriminatory rents among crops 
and among such resources as buildings ,  pasture and cropland. 
Although there is much less literature on the problems and goals of 
farm landlords , the evidence , such as it is, indicates that the lack of 
security of the amount of rent, particularly under share-rent leases , is 
the major problem. Next comes the landlord ' s  insecurity about the 
preservation of the productivity of his property. Thus the landlord' s  
goals are to get a tenant who will do a good job of farming, pay a fair 
rent , and maintain the farm. 
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PUBLIC LAND DISPOSAL BY LEASEHOLD AND FREEHOLD IN CANADA, AUSTRALIA, 
NEW ZEALAND, AND THE NETHERLANDS 
Paul O'Rourke 
I .  LAND POLICIES OF TWO CANADIAN PRAIRIE PROVINCES 
Introduction 
Alberta and Saskatchewan are the only Canadian Provinces which 
dispose of their public lands for intensive agriculture by leasehold as 
well as by freehold. The history, geography and land disposition policies 
of the two Provinces are similar. 
During the years of settlement, between 1870 and 1930, the Canadian 
government controlled the public lands in the Prairie Provinces. Its land 
policy closely resembled that of the United States--making land available 
in fee simple and encouraging rapid settlement. 
When the Dominion government relinquished the land to the Provinces 
in 1930, the drought and rural depression of the twenties and thirties 
forced the Provincial governments to reevaluate land policy. Rapid set­
tlement gave way to conservation as a primary objective of land policy, 
and the farmers' lack of capital influenced the Provinces to adopt a 
policy of leasing the lands . Since the 1930s both Provinces have con­
tinued to lease , but with different emphasis. Alberta has stressed leas­
ing as a temporary alternative to freeholding. Saskatchewan stressed 
leasing between 1945 and 1962 , but in 1955 it allowed veterans who were 
holding leases to purchase their lands , and in 1962 all other leaseholders 
were permitted to purchase. 
Geographically, the Provinces are each divided into three soil zones . 
A Brown Soil Zone in the South was once a wheat growing region, but since 
the drought of the 1930's, it has been primarily a grazing area. Today 
the public land is generally leased for grazing purposes. This region is 
surrounded on the north and east by a more fertile Black Soil Zone in 
Paul O'Rourke is Assistant Professor of History at South Dakota 
State University, Brookings , South Dakota. 
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which oats and barley are important crops. Here , fee simple ownership 
is the rule. The northernmost tier, extending to the Canadian shield, 
is the Grey-Wooded Soil Zone, a largely underdeveloped region suitable 
for legumes , oats , and barley ( although not wheat) but requiring exten­
sive clearing, breaking and drainage . This is the region where the 
Provincial governments lease most of their land for intensive agri­
culture and where their experience is most relevant for American land 
policy. l 
Saskatchewan Land Policies 
Saskatchewan has emphasized leasing its public lands more than 
any other Canadian Province .  In 1953 the Saskatchewan Royal Connnission 
on Agriculture and Rural Life justified leasing on several grounds : ·  
1 .  Since virtually all of the land leased i s  in the Grey-Wooded 
Soil Zone and requires extensive government improvements ,  the govern­
ment can recover the cost only through leasing. 
2 .  These frontier lands are vulnerable to inflation, exceeding 
production increases , which would increase the tax and debt burden of 
individuals purchasing freeholds. 
3 .  A leaseholder is in a much better position than an indebted 
owner to obtain adequate machinery and working capital and to operate 
a larger unit . 
4. The government ' s  conservation goals can be more easily at­
tained on state-owned land rather than on undersized and undercapital­
ized private land. 
5 .  The government leasing policy probably stimulates better 
private leasing arrangements and holds down private rental charges , an 
important consideration in a Province where almost half the private 
land is leased. 
1c.  C. Spence , "Government Policy and Land Use in Western Canada 
in Land Economics Institute , University of Illinois , Modern Land Policy 
( Urbana, Illinois : University of Illinois Press,  1960), pp."""Jb7-68 ; 
V. A. Wood, "Public Land Policy for Alberta , "  ( Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department of Agricultural Economics , University of Minnesota, 1953) ,  
pp. 131-33; P. E.  Polischuk, Director of Lands , Province of Saskatchew­
an, ( letter, 20 November 1968) . 
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6.  Through its leasing program the government also helps free­
holders to reach economic farm sizes by renting them small parcels of 
public land. 2 
The Connnission ' s  analysis of the advantages of leasing was by no 
means unique . What is surprising is that Saskatchewan adopted the 
leasing policy despite the preference ,  pointed out by the Commission, 
for private ownership in the frontier areas. 
The basic explanation for the government ' s  persistence in this 
policy is the lack of demand for available public lands . The high 
cost of improving the land in the Grey-Wooded Soil Zone, high costs 
of operation, low crop and livestock prices ,  the absence of roads and 
social amenities have discouraged prospective settlers in an era of 
urban immigration. A postwar settlement plan for veterans created 
some demand, but since the mid-fifties there has been virtually no 
demand for farmland in Saskatchewan. The main goal of the government ' s  
land disposal policy in recent years has been to create economic sizes 
of existing farms by leasing public lands to their operators.3 
The settlers '  main pressure on the government in recent years 
has been for the enlargement of their current holdings rather than 
for new homesteads. Until lately, the government considered 480 acres 
an adequate economic unit if half the unit were suitable for crop 
production. The Commission in 1953 noted the paucity of studies on 
the rate of return from agricultural lands and suggested that 240 acres 
of good cropland might be inadequate in the North. The government 
eventually acceded to the demand for increasing the maxi.mum from 480 
to 800 acres .4 The number of leases and acres of public lands leased 
in 1967 by Saskatchewan follows : 
Cultivation leases 





398 , 382 (arable) 
5 , 738, 606 
2saskatchewan Connnission on Agriculture and Rural Life, Report �· 
2, Land Tenure : Rights and Responsibilities in Land Use in Saskatchewan 
(Regina , Saskatchewan : Queen' s  Printer, 1955J:° pp. 54-68 . 
3Burke G. Vanderhill ,  "The Decline of Land Settlement in Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan, "  Economic Geography 38 , no. 3 (1962) , pp. 270-73; 
A. M. Thomson, Director of Lands , Province of Saskatchewan (letter , 9 
March 1966) .  
4c. C. Spence, Modern Land Policy, pp. 378, 381 ; Saskatchewan Com­
mission on Agriculture and Rural Life , Report no . 5 ,  pp. 88-89. 
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Between 1961 and 1967 there were 2,431 Provincial sales involving 
521 , 106 acres of cultivated land.5 
Rentals are paid prima�ily in cash. The government prefers this 
system because the sharecropper can cover up his yield and put the 
burden of proof on the Province .  Sharecropping has declined to such an 
extent that the Province granted no lands on share rentals in 1966-67. 
Rentals are based on the appraised value of the land, which is 
derived from soil productivity ratings ; these in turn are converted in­
to monetary values that fluctuate according to crop prices .  In actu­
ality, the land is appraised below market values .  Each tract is re­
evaluated every fifth year, and rents are generally assessed at 6 per­
cent of the appraised value . This rate is adjustable ; however, the 
adjustments are usually downward. The Commission in 1953 recommended 
more flexibility in rentals,  claiming they were too high in the initial 
years of the lease and too low in later years.  Two unusual provisions 
of the standard cultivation lease which benefit the tenant are : 
1 .  An 8 percent discount if the 
the current crop year when it is due . 
July 31 of the following year because 
the Canadian Wheat Board. There is a 
is not paid by August. ) 
rent is paid by December 1 of 
( Payment may be deferred until 
of the quota delivery system of 
6 percent penalty if the rental 
2. In years of complete crop failure or ver::r low yield, a com­
plete or partial write-off "of rent" :3.,s allowed. 6  
Since 1965 , the government will sell--except for fractional land 
sales--only to a lessee who has held the land for at least five years 
and who has at least 25 percent of his acreage under cultivation. The 
minimum price is $20 an acre for arable land and $10 an acre for un­
improved land, The government reduces the selling price by $50 for 
every year the lessee holds the land (up to a maximum of $500 or 10 
percent of the appraisal price, whichever is greater) .  Purchases on 
time require a 20 percent down payment with the balance to be paid 
within 30 years .  
5Saskatchewan Department of Agriculture , Annual Report of the 
Director of Lands , 12§1 (Regina, Saskatchewan: Queen' s  Printer , 1967) , 
PP• 137-44. 
6Thomson ( letter, 9 March 1966) ; Saskatchewan Department of 
Lands , p. 136 ; "Cash Rental Agricultural Lease , "  Saskatchewan Depart­
ment of Lands (Regina, Saskatchewan) ; Saskatchewan Commission on Agri­
culture and Rural Life , Report no. 5 ,  pp. 88-89 . 
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Lack of security of tenure has been a problem, although it is not 
nearly so severe on leased public lands as on the private lands of the 
Province, The standard cultivation lease now runs for 10 year s ,  The 
tenant has priority over other applicants at renewal time, yet the ad­
ministration of this provision in Saskatchewan has apparently caused 
uncertainty among lessees, The Commission in 1953 recommended a defi­
nite guarantee of the lessee ' s  right of renewal, Ideally, it suggested 
abolishing the standard 33-year lease altogether in favor of a combina� 
tion of an interim with a perpetual lease. The farmer would receive 
an interim lease until he had demonstrated his ability. Then, he would 
get a perpetual lease, which the Commission was convinced would guaran­
tee security of tenure without the indebtedness handicaps that go with 
freeholding , 7  
Lack of compensation for improvements has also been a problem in 
the northern region where land development requires considerable work, 
Under the standard agricultural lease,· the tenant clears and breaks the 
land, The government compensates him for his expenses up to $30 an 
acre which he may credit against his rent. The lessee owns the farm 
buildings and fencing and is entitled to compensation upon termination 
of his lease, A popular lease in new settlement areas is . the Project 
Lease under which the government clears and breaks 50 acres while the 
tenant clears the brush piles , The tenant may not credit the cost of 
clearing additional lan� against arry of the rental from these 50 acres, 
A possible solution to the problem of improvements· is the . Veter­
ans Lease which leads toward eventual - ownership. The Province made 
these 10-year leases to World War II veterans as a part of the Dominion ' s  
resettlement programs , The veteran-lessee received a $2,320 loan from 
the Dominion government which be came an outright grant if he stayed on 
the land for 10 years , He had to bring all arable land under cultivation 
within six years and was allowed remission of rent only for the first 
year of cultivation, After 10 years he was to purchase the land out­
right at a price that made allowance for his improvements. Although the 
Veterans Lease is largely a thing of the past, the prospect of eventual 
ownership largely solved the problem of lack of compensation for un­
exhausted improvements and the grants helped to provide needed capital , 8 
?Spence, Modern Land Policy, p. 378; Saskatchewan Commission on 
Agriculture and Rural Life, Report no, 5, p. 90. 
8 Saskatchewan Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life ,  Report 
no, 5, p. 86 . 
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The Commission also pointed out some weaknesses of the Province ' s  
leasing policy and offered some suggestions for alleviating them: 
1. The cost of clearing and breaking the land often exceeded the 
$25 per acre the government paid the lessee for this purpose. The 
Department of Lands estimated the average cost for the Grey-Wooded Soil 
Zone at $26.42 an acre. Since the government was to own these improve­
ments, the Commission suggested it pay full compensation for them. If 
the government decided it could not afford to pay the full cost of 
developing the land, the Commission wondered if the land was worth set­
tling. Since 195J the compensation for clearing and breaking has been 
raised to $JO an acre. 
2. Because the lessee finds it difficult to raise capital since 
he can offer no land as security, the Commission recommended that the 
government advance him the money before he makes the improvements in­
stead of compensating him afterwards as it does at present. 
J. The Commission advised that the lessee receive compensation 
for such improvements as tree planting and grass seeding which are not 
presently remunerable. The Province, however , did not act upon this 
recommendation. The Commission also noted, in passing, that cooperative 
farms in which several farmers participated have helped to develop new 
land in Saskatchewan more rapidly than have farms with individual 
lessees.9 
Related to the problem of improvements is the lessee's lack of 
capital. The Commission believed that the answer lay with the Domin­
ion government' s  various loan programs , which it wanted consolidated 
into a proposed "Canadian Farm Credit Administration. " The Connnission 
suggested that the three-year period for repaying loans on machinery 
be extended, simply because machinery lasts longer than three years. 
It also wanted a JO-year repayment period on large government loans and 
allowance for prepayment of loans with commensurate interest reductions. 
In the private sector it urged bankers to extend more short-term credit 
to farmers, and it advised farmers and local communities to stop obtain­
ing credit from retail stores and to help themselves by establishing 
credit unions. 10 
9Thomson (letter , 9 March 1966) ; Saskatchewan Commission on Agri­
culture and Rural Life, Report no. 5,  p. 86 ; Saskatchewan Department 
of Lands , p. 1J2. 
10saskatchewan Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life, Report 
no. 5, pp. 100-104 ; Polischuk ( letter, 20 November 1968). 
J6 
The government does not interfere ve-ry lllllch with the tenant' s  
farming activities. The Department of Lands rental contract does allow 
it to dictate a plan of tillage, summer fallow, crop rotation, weed 
control, and the treatment of grain or other farm produce in order to 
enhance productivity. In practice, however, the Department has done 
little to implement its contract powers. The Commission urged the ­
government to supervise the tenant ' s . conservation activities more 
closely. However , the trend has been in the opposite direction · since 
the replacement of the crop share lease with a cash rental lease has 
substantially reduced the amount of supervision. The Commission also 
noted that many lessees were ignorant of the Province ' s  land laws and 
pointed out that Britain publishes an abbreviated guide to the legis­
lation in the form of a handbook. It also urged a more stringent set­
tler selection process to eliminate poor farming practices. However, 
because of the dearth of applications for farm lands, this suggestion 
has proved difficult to implement. 
Apart from general land policy, many tenants have been dissatisfied 
with qelays in official approval of sales and leases resulting from the 
high annual turnover rate of local agents of the Lands Department.11 
In conclusion--since northern Saskatchewan is a fringe area neces­
sitating extensive improvements , experiences there may have some rele­
vance for the Western United States .  
Alberta � Policies 
While the Province of Alberta also has leased public lands since 
the 1930s, its land disposal program differed substantially from 
Saskatchewan' s  before the latter reversed its policies in 1965. In 
Alberta, alienation of public lands has always remained the ultimate 
goal with leasing merely a tempora-ry solution. While the Cultivation 
Lease has easily been the most important intensive agricultural lease 
in Saskatchewan, the Homestead Lease with the right of conversion to 
the freehold has been the overwhelming choice in Alberta. 
In 1953 Wood , now the Director of Lands in Alberta, recommended 
that the Province sell, rather than lease, the land wherever possible . 12 
Wood pointed out that Alberta farmers ,  like farmers in Saskatchewan, New 
Zealand, Australia, and the United States ,  prefer to hold their land in 
11Polischuk (letter, 20 November 1968) .  
12v. A. Wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta. "  
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fee simple because more status is attached to land ownership. They 
as sociate leasing with insecure tenure, lack of compensation for im­
provements , and lack of freedom of operation. Wood agreed with the 
Saskatchewan Connnission ' s  view that leasing could often prove more 
beneficial to the farmer than freeholding. Yet, unlike the Saskatch­
ewan Connnission, he concluded that the vital consideration was the 
inability of the average farmer to grasp the advantages of leasing. 
He recommended farm ownership because it resulted in " a  greater will­
ingness to sacrifice time , money, and labor for development " (p.  150 ) . 
Since the 19JOs ,  Alberta has disposed of its lands suited for 
intensive agriculture by sale , Homestead Lease , or by short-term Cul­
tivation Lease. In recent years the Province has virtually abandoned 
leasing in favor of freeholding. Implementing Wood ' s  recommendations , 
it has ceased issuing Homestead Leases although 2600 such leases are 
still in force. Wood envisioned Cultivation Leases as stopgap measures 
in the southern grazing areas where some land might be turned over to 
farming under modern farming techniques on an experimental basis. If 
found suitable for farming , the land could be sold outright. Yet, 
leases are still important on Alberta public lands , and as of 1967, the 
following were in effect : 
Number Total acres 
Homestead Leases 2 , 600 673,333 
Cultivation Leases 830 159 ,634 
Miscellaneous leases 1 , 155 74,596 
Grazing Leases and Permits 6 , 444 4, 969 ,459 
In the same year the following sales were in proces s :  
Number Total acres ��-
Homestead sales in force 4 , 199 1 , 115 , 290 
Agricultural farm sales 1, 710 307 , 927 
Public land sales 1 , 551 231, 584 
As these figures indicate , there is considerable demand for land in 
Alberta. Most of this demand is found in the Peace River Valley in 
the Northwest. 
As in Saskatchewan, there has been agitation in Alberta for 
increasing the size of public land grants to form more viable eco­
nomic units . In recent years the Province has increased the maximum 
J8 
area granted from 320 to 800 acres,  of which half must be cultivat­
able . 13 
Rentals are largely paid in cash rather than in crop shares .  Under 
the Homestead Leases, however, the farmer is not required to pay rent 
on lands he breaks himself during the first three years .  In the fourth 
year he pays one-eighth of the value of his crop. On lands already 
under cultivation he pays one-fourth of the value of his crop as rent . 
He may apply for title after five years by paying $100 a quarter or 
$300 a half section. In the next five years 20 percent of his title 
payment is written off provided he has fulfilled the government ' s  re­
quirements for improving the land. During the entire 10-year period he 
pays no taxe s ,  these being calculated in the government ' s  share of his 
crop. At the end of 10 years he acquires title . 
Under Cultivation Leases the rent is based on the asses sed value 
of the land. The government may forgive the lessee his rent for the 
first four years for breaking the land. At the end of this period, or 
earlier if 25 percent or more of the land is under cultivation, the rent 
i s  a minimum of 30 cents an acre . Under Cultivation Leases, the tenant 
is not automatically entitled to convert to fee simple ownership as are 
Homestead Lease tenants.  However, he has first choice if the Department 
of Lands decides to sell the land. 
Under the government ' s  Homestead Lease policy, the purchaser may 
also be forgiven his rent and taxes for up to four years,  after which 
he is required to make his payments in no more than 19 annual install­
ments with 4.5  percent annual interest on the balance. The Department 
of Lands bases its rent on the assessed value of the land and the cost 
to the government of providing access to the land. 
Agricultural farm sales are used less frequently and are generally 
for more developed lands . The purchaser ' s  equity is in cash rather 
than in leasing and breaking, and the payment term is generally shorter . 
A down payment of at least 20 percent of the purchase price is required 
with the remainder to be paid in installments with 4 . 5  percent annual 
interest on the balance . The years allowed for payment are as follows : 
10 years when the purchase price is less than $1 ,500 ; 
15 years when the purchase price is from $1, 500 to $3,500 ; 
20 years when the purchase price is $3 , 500 or more. 
l3Alberta Department of Lands, Annual Report, 1967, (&imonton: 
L. S .  Wall , 1967) , pp. 25-29 ; Province of Alberta, An Act Respecting 
Public Lands , 1966 ( Edmonton: Queen' s  Printer, 1966}, p. 27 ; Von 
Eckhard Ehlers , "Landpolitik und Landpotential in den nordlichen Kana­
dischen Prairie provinzen, "� Auslandische Landwirt, V ( January 1966 ) ,  
p. 55. 
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Wood considered alternate methods of consummating sales and lease 
disposals. He preferred sealed bids to public auctions because he be­
lieved that auctions unduly inflated the value of the land and that 
sealed bids came closer to t�e market value. He suggested that where 
the available land was inadequate to form an economic farm unit, the 
government should sell the land to the local farmer who most needed it. 14 
In Alberta as in Saskatchewan, there appears to be little disagreement 
with the government ' s  rental rates or sale prices based on market value . 
Insecurity of tenure has not been a serious problem since the 
government ' s  land policy has been geared to eventual ownership. Home­
stead Leases are granted for a period of 20 years with a right of re­
newal for another 20 years ,  thus providing ample time to convert the 
leasehold to a freehold. Cultivation Leases are limited to 10 year s ,  
with the lessee having first preference if the government wishes to 
renew it. As noted previously, Cultivation Leases may be converted to 
purchase agreements if the land is found suitable for agriculture. 
Wood recommended in 1953 that the lessee no longer be allowed to 
assign his lease. Such assignments were often quite profitable because 
the government ' s  rental rates were generally below the open market 
rental rates. Provided that he received equitable compensation for 
improvements, Wood saw no reason why a lessee should make a profit at 
the expense of the government. While his recommendation was not im­
plemented, the shift away from leasing since 1953 has helped to resolve 
the problem. On homestead sales the Province does not permit the 
purchaser to transfer the land unless he has performed the cultivation 
duties prescribed by the government for at least four years .15 
14spence, Modern Land Policy, p. 377 ; Government of the Province 
of Alberta , The Public Lands Act, 1966 ,  Cultivation Lease and Permit 
Regulations ( Edmonton: Queen' s Printer ,  1966), pp. 1-3 ; Government of 
the Province of Alberta ,  The Public Lands Act, 'j[J66, Homestead Sale 
( Edmonton: Queen' s  Printer , 1966), pp. 9 ,  11-1 ; Government of the 
Province of Alberta , The Public Lands Act, 1966, A
�
ricultural � 
Sales Regulations ( Edmonton: Queen' s  Printer , 196 ), p. 3 ; Wood, 
"Public Land Policy for Alberta , "  pp. 164-66. 
l5v. A.  Wood, "Alberta ' s  Land Policy, Past and Present , "  Journal 
of Farm Economics 33 ( November 1951) , p. 741 ; Alberta Department of 
Lands , Annual Report, 1967 ; Wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta , "  
pp. 160-61; Province of Alberta , An Act Respecting Public Lands , p. 36 .  
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Compensation for improvements has not been an important problem of 
Alberta' s public land policy. The lessee has long been entitled to 
compensation for permanent improvements. Wood recommended compensation 
also for an increase in soil fertility and for unjustified disturbance. 
Although the government still does not compensate for an increase in 
soil fertility, it does give more consideration to paying compensation 
for cultivation, clearing, summer fallowing, etc. at the expiration of 
a lease. Recent legislation has clarified the lessee's  rights when 
rights of way, pipelines, etc. disturb his quiet enjoyment of his lease.16 
As in Saskatchewan, Alberta farmers have not complained as much 
about rental rates, insecurity of tenure, or compensation for improve­
ments and freedom of operations as about insufficient capital for im­
provements. In contrast to Saskatchewan, which extends cash grants per 
acre to the lessee for putting land into cultivation, Alberta provided no 
capital to its settlers until recently. However, rents may be forgiven 
for the first three crop years of the lease. Mortgage payments do not 
start until the fourth year when fewer than 25 acres are cultivated, the 
third year when 25-50 acres are cultivated, and the second year when more 
than 50 acres are cultivated. For every quarter section held, the Home­
stead Lease farmer is obliged to break and seed to crop a minimum acreage 
as follows : 
Year Acres to break Acres to seed 
First 10 0 
Second 10 10 
Third 10 20 
Fourth 10 JO 
Fifth 0 40 
Sixth 0 40 
Seventh 10 40 
Eighth 10 50 
Ninth 0 60 
Tenth 0 60 
Cultivation Lease requirements are similar. Since most of the 
public lands leased or sold require extensive improvements, the govern­
ment' s land utilization requirements, along with the absence of capital, 
have posed severe problems which the government has not yet satisf actor­
ily solved. One suggestion for solving this problem is for the government 
16wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta," p. 160; V. A. Wood, Direc­
tor of Lands, Province of Alberta (letter, 21 November 1968). 
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to develop the land before selling it to farmers . Another is that the 
land should be sold to large private investors who would develop the 
land and resell to farmers . Both of these methods have been used in 
Australia. 
Wood reconnnended in 1953 that the Province guarantee loans for im­
provements made through regular agencies like the Provincial Treasury 
Board or the Dominion Government Farm Loan Board. To protect itself 
the government would restrict the larger share of the loan to capital 
improvements on the land itself. Wood felt that the lessee should be 
required to invest some of his own money since this gives him more 
pride in his farm and work. In the past decade, Alberta has begun to 
extend financial assistance to new settlers through loans with a leni­
ent repayment plan at 4 . 5  percent interest. Two alternative methods 
of government assistance suggested by Wood were a direct subsidy, as 
in Saskatchewan, or government-created, permanent improvements to be 
rented or sold on easy terms to the lessee. Wood shied away from the 
latter because it smacks of government paternalism. While he argued 
that the settler needed capital assistance , Wood believed that too much 
government help would stifle initiative. 17 
One of Wood' s  ideas that has been partially adopted was that resi­
dence rules should be eased. These rules required the settler to 
establish residence the first year and to live ther9 for six months 
of each year thereafter. Wood argued that since most lessees must work 
away from the farm to obtain sufficient capital for the initial im­
provements ,  no residence should be required the first two years and 
only three months in the third year . The 1966 Public Land Law merely 
requires three months residence a year for a homesteader who is pur­
chasing his land . 18 
Wood and others have recognized that the government must provide 
not only land improvement assistance but also more roads and social 
services to enhance the attractiveness of life in frontier regions . 19 
l7Province of Alberta, An Act Respecting Public Lands, 1966 ,  pp. 
24, 29 , 30 ;  Wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta , "  p. 160 ; Wood 
( letter , 21 November 1968 ) . 
18wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta, "  p. 189. 
19T .  W. Manning, Chairman, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
University of Alberta ( letter, 15 August 1968 ) ; Wood, " Public Land 
Policy for Alberta , "  p. 163. 
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The Province has never seriously interfered with the farmer ' s  
freedom of operation, except in the most extreme cases of abuse .  Al­
though the various public land acts demand good farming practices,  
enforcement is  the responsibility of overworked district agricultur­
alists under the Department of Agriculture , who have been unable to 
give sufficient attention to it apart from other duties .  Wood be­
lieved that when necessary, the government should use its police powers 
to prevent freeholders from causing soil deterioration. He noted that 
the Provincial government had little statutory authority over land­
owners and hoped for the enactment of more legislation like the Noxious 
Weeds Act. He also hoped that the government would specify in its 
leases the use to be made of the land. Wood conceded, however, that the 
popular belief in the sanctity of private property probably precluded 
the acceptance of his recommendations . He suggested that the same end 
might be achieved by providing farmers with more technical advice and 
by taxing land on the basis of its productivity. Although Wood ' s  
suggestions have not been implemented, the Province has attacked the 
problem from another angle by screening applicants for public lands. 
In some areas in recent years it has established boards composed of 
representatives of the Department of Lands and prominent farmers,  to 
review and make recommendations on applications for public lands. 20 
To conclude--Alberta ' s  land disposal policies for intensive agri­
culture are probably the most pertinent to the situation in the United 
States .  Although the Province has leased its public lands, its basic 
goal has been fee simple ownership. 
Grazing Leases 
Although grazing leases are not the primary purpose of this study, 
a note on the leasing policy for grazing lands in Alberta and Saskat­
chewan may be of interest. In neither Province has there ever been any 
real controversy over public ownership. While Canadians strongly ap­
prove private ownership of farms , they agree on public ownership of 
range land. 
20
Province of Alberta , An Act Respecting Public Lands , 1966 , pp. 
15-16 ; Wood, "Public Land Policy for Alberta ,"  pp. 72, 146, 153 ; Wood, 
"Alberta ' s  Land Policy,"  Journal of Farm Economics , pp. 747-48 ; Wood 
( letter, 21 November 1968). 
- --
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In Alberta, rental rates have been the main source of contention 
over the years. In the 19J0s and early 1940s the rent was based on 
a flat rate per acre. Ranchers objected to this system because of the 
low cattle and sheep prices �nd the droughts of the thirties .  In 1945 
the government adopted a flexible cash rent that was proposed by Al­
berta stockgrowers .  Under the new method the rent per acre is "one­
tenth of the annual rate of gain of cattle on grass in pounds of beef 
per head, multiplied by the weighted average price of all classes of 
cattle • • •  on the Calgary market • • •  in the preceding year, divided 
by the number of acres required to carry a mature head of cattle on the 
range for twelve months . 11 21 Ironically, the plan raised rents rather 
than lowering them because it was introduced during the postwar era of 
rising price s .  Saskatchewan has since adopted this plan. 
Ranchers have been encouraged to practice sound conservation 
principles .  They may not carry as many cattle under the new as they 
did under the old rate schedule , but the cattle and the range are 
maintained in better condition. Despite the higher rentals the ranch­
ers are generally satisfied. 
Lands are generally leased for grazing for a term of 20 years in 
Alberta and 21 years in Saskatchewan. The lease is renewable and 
assignable by the lessee. He is entitled to compensation for improve­
ments , although here again the real difficulty is a �ack of capital. 
Wood wanted the government to provide limited financial assistance to 
encourage range development and improvements such as reseeding, develop­
ing water supplies ,  and eradicating bush and poisonous weeds. He also 
favored range management plans worked out by ranchers and government 
experts. 22 
21v.  A. Wood and J .  A. Campbell , "A Range Land Rental System Based 
on Grazing Capacity and the Price of Beef , "  Journal of Range Manage­
ment 4 (November 1951) , pp. 370-4. 
22wood, "Public Land Policy for Alberta , "  p. 171 ;  Province of 
Alberta , An Act Respecting Public Lands, 1966, pp. 15-16 . 
II . AUSTRALIAN LAND POLICIES 
Intensive Agriculture 
A discussion of Australian public land policy is  complicated be­
cause it includes the policies of the six separate £tates that hold most 
of the public lands . The Commonwealth government is directly responsi­
ble only for the Northern Territory and therefore , a wide variety of 
land policies and legislation exists , Nevertheles s , some general char­
acteristics of Australian land policy are discernible. There is much 
more public than private land , and most of the public lands are used 
for grazing under a lease, The tenure status of Australian lands is 
shown in the following table : 
Private and public ownership of lands in Australia , 
by States and Territory , 1964 
Total acres Private lands Public lands 
Government (millions) Alienated In process Leased Other 
------------------percent--------------
New South Wales 198 JO 4 57 9 
Victoria 56 57 4 11 28 
Queensland 427 6 1 87 6 
South Australia 243 7 ( * )  60 33 
Western Australia 625 5 2 40 53 
Northern Territory 333 (* ) ( * )  58 42 
Tasmania 17 39 1 9 51 
Australia 1900 9 2 56 33 
Source : Australian Bureau of Census , Yearbook , no. 52 ( 1966 ) ,  as 
presented by Campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Econozgy, p. 172. 
*Less than 1 . 0  percent. 
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As in the United States and Canada , Australia has generally free­
holded its land for intensive agriculture ,  although some States have 
pref erred to lease in order to resume land for closer settlement. The 
State of Queensland and the Commonwealth in the Northern Territory have 
preferred leasing. But in recent years ,  even these areas have turned 
to freeholding. 
Special Commonwealth investigating commissions have recommended 
the freehold over the leasehold. In 1944, the Rural Reconstruction 
Commission, which studied the prospects for Australian agriculture 
after World War II, reported that "land ownership implies a freedom 
from interference, a continuity of existence on one property, "  and 
noted the social prestige that land ownership conferred. In 1959 the 
Commission to Inquire into the Prospects for Agriculture in the North­
ern Territory recommended that the Commonwealth permit freeholds there. 
It declared that even a perpetual lease did not provide secure tenure 
since some of the land could be resumed for closer settlement. 
The perpetual lease has been recently def ended by Campbell who 
pointed out that it requires no initial capital investment and that it 
provides secure tenure which eases the obtaining of production loans 
and encourages improvement and good farming practices. Like Wood in 
Alberta, he argued that the perpetual lease is often superior to the 
freehold. But in Australia , as in Alberta , the popularity of the free­
hold seems too strong to resist. 23 
At present, the major is sue in Australian land policy is the con­
cept of the. home maintenance area" which has been written into land 
legislation of every State. The home maintenance area is generally 
defined a s ,  "an area which when used for the purpose for which it is 
reasonably fitted would be sufficient for the maintenance in average 
23Keith Campbell, "Land Policy," Agriculture in the Australian 
Econorgy, ed. D. B. Williams ( Sydney: Sydney University Press , 1967 ) ,  
p. 172 ; A .  C .  Lloyd, "The Economic Size of Farms , "  Journal of the 
Australian Institute of Agricultural Science 27 ( September 1961')"";" p. 
140 ; Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Territories ,  Committee 
to Inquire into the Prospects of Agriculture in the Northern Territory, 
Prospects of Agriculture in the Northern Territory ( Canberra : Queen' s  
Printer, 1959) , p. 156. Hereafter cited as " Committee on the Northern 
Territory'' ; Keith Campbell, " Current Issues in Australian Agriculture , "  
delivered as the G .  L .  Wood Memorial Lecture at the University of 
Melbourne on 26 August 1966. 
seasons and circumstances of the average family. "  This concept dates 
from the turn of the century and has been used to encourage the family 
farm under both freeholding and leasing. 
Since World War II the interpretation of the home maintenance 
area concept has been sharply criticized by economist s .  As Australia 
has become even more conscious of agriculture as the basis of its 
econonzy-, it has tended to emphasize economic factors at the expense 
of social considerations . Critics of the home maintenance area con­
cept stress that modern technology has expanded the area that may be 
farmed adequately. They also argue that a static formula based on an 
" average year" founders on wide fluctuations in annual rainfall or 
farm prices .  While few want the home maintenance area abolished, most 
urge its revision so that it will work to expand, rather than to con­
tract, farm size. 24 
On Australian lands, complaints about rents have not been a signi­
ficant problem. Political pressure , as in Canada and the United State s ,  
tends to cause land t o  be undervalued for assessment. A typical rental 
rate is 2 . 5  percent of the assessed value of the land. Lessees often 
sell their leases before their terms expire and often realize handsome 
profits because purchasers are willing to pay for the difference be­
tween the government ' s  low rental rate and the rental value of the land 
in the market place. 
Current criticism of rental policy does not come from settlers but 
from economists anxious that the government earn a fair return from its 
property. Campbell believes that the lessee should not profit from the 
government ' s  low rent when selling his leas e ,  and MacPhillamey wants 
more frequent valuations so that rents will keep pace with rising 
values . 25 
There has been s ome objection that any lease short of a per­
petual lease or purchase lease does not provide secure tenure . Queens­
land and the Northern Territory have traditionally limited their leases 
24campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Econosy, p. 174; Samuel 
Wadham, Australian Farming, 1788-� (Melbourne : F .  W. Cheshire, 
1967) , p. 46; J. N. Lewis ,  "Is the Concept of the Home Maintenance Area 
Outmoded? " Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 7 (December 
1963 ) , p.  104. � 
25campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Econosy, p. 175 ; Committee 
on the Northern Territory, p. 15b;C. H. MacPhillamey, "Factors Affecting 
Rural Land Prices in N . S .W. and the Construction of Indexes of Rural 
Land Value s , "  Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 8 (December 
1964) , p. 153. 
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to 25 to 40-year periods in order to regain land for closer settlement. 
Campbell and Gruen argue that this policy is anachronistic since the 
shorter term provides relatively little incentive for capital invest­
ment in an age when such investment has become especially important . 
In recent years Australia has endeavored to provide more security 
of tenure .  In 1952 Queensland alleviated some of the lessee ' s  uncer­
tainty by allowing hilll, if his term had more than seven years to run, 
to retain a home maintenance area when the lease is terminated for 
subdivision into smaller units for closer settlement. 
New South Wales in 1966 relinquished its right to repo s sess land 
for closer settlement on a large number of estate s .  And the Northern 
Territory has allowed its leases to be renewed for a full term before 
repossessing the land. Presently, most Australian leases for intensive 
agriculture are perpetual with provision for freeholding after the 
pattern set b� the Commonwealth in the War Service Settlement Scheme 
in the 1940s .  6 
Freedom to illlprove is currently not a problem since in most 
Australian States the lessee receives compensation for permanent 
improvements. Instead, lack of sufficient capital for improvements 
is the prevailing source of discontent. By 1967 standards it is 
e stimated that £ 40 , 000 are needed to buy a grain farm and equip it 
with machinery and livestock. Critics have generally recommended 
adjustments , but no major changes have been made by present credit 
agencies ,  which include trading banks and pastoral finance companies. 
To permit farmers to adopt scientific technology, more credit is 
needed. But the Committee to Inquire into the Prospects of Agriculture 
in the Northern Territory recommended that the government should avoid 
as much as possible the extension of direct credit to the farmer . It 
should also be noted that one reason the States have turned to the free­
hold lies in the inability of leaseholders to obtain capital because 
they cannot o£fer freeholds as security. 
26campbell , " Current Issues in Australian Agriculture, "  p. 7 ;  F .  H .  
Gruen, "Capital Formation in Australian Agriculture , "  Australian 
J ournal of Agricultural Economics I (February 1957) , p. 102; T .  H. 
Strong, "Land Tenure in Australia in Relation to Technical Advances 
and Closer Settlement, "  Journal of Farm Economics 38 (May 1956) , p. 463 ; 
Campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Economy, p. 177 ; Committee on 
the Northern Territory, p. 154. 
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The State governments , however, compound the capital problem by 
requiring lessees to develop their land rapidly. Western Australia, 
for example ,  requires the holder of a conditional purchase lease to 
clear and pasture 1000 acres of a 2500-acre farm in a five-year period. 
Moncrieff showed that only farmers with an initial capital of $25 , 000 
could comply with thi s requirement and still achieve the maximum re­
turn. Below the $25 , 000 level they would have to use less seed and 
fertilizer with a corresponding reduction in net prdfit. 27 
Since World War II Australia has experimented with three possible 
solutions to the farmer ' s  capital conundrums : (1) the War Service Land 
Settlement Scheme , ( 2) State government development projects , and (3 )  
private development by land investment companies.  Under the first 
approach, the States improved the land, often erecting structural im­
provements . Even after the basic developmental phase , the States 
granted the settler a living allowance until the land was brought up 
to standard. Although tne value of the improvements was added to the 
settler ' s  rent or purchase price, the government never recovered its 
full investment in land or development. The program was regarded as 
successful, but it is doubtful that it could be revived today because 
it rested on the non-economic objective of rewarding veterans , while 
today' s  objectives are more strictly economic. 
Although the veterans ' demand for land has abated, some State 
governments have continued development programs now open to all settlers .  
The Conunonwealth government has continued to provide financial assis­
tance . There are several current governmental projects for intensive 
agriculture. One is the Brigalow Land Development Scheme in Queensland 
in which farms are being made available for cereal and wheat production 
and stockgrowing. Another is the Coleambally Irrigation Area project 
in New South Wales where 1000 new farms are being planned to produce 
fruit and vegetables along with cereals and wheat. There are also two 
projects in Western Australia--one in the Oral River valley where the 
feasibility of irrigated crops of cotton, sorghum and safflower is being 
investigated and one in the Esperance area in the Southwest which is 
devoted to stock raising and cereal growing. Because the world market 
price for beef is much more favorable than for wheat and cereal crops , 
Australia hesitates to undertake additional projects . The land is made 
available in a variety of leases and purchase agreements , but all the 
27 I .  J .  Moncrieff, "The Land Act and Farm Development , "  Farm 
Policy 3 (September 1963) , p. 47; I .  J .  Moncrieff and R. G. Maulden, 
"The Effect of Land Clearing Regulations on the Rate of Farm Develop­
ment--A Case Study, "  Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 7 
(December 1963 ) ,  p. 176. 
� 
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lands devoted to intensive agriculture can eventually be freeholded. 
Unlike the Connnonwealth' s  War Service Land Settlement Scheme , the 
State governments do not give special subsidies. Rather these State 
plans tend to impose minimum capital requirements .  
In addition to public land development , Australia has also experi­
mented with private programs , which so far have not proved very success­
ful. This approach still suffers from the failure of the Esperance 
Scheme in Western Australia in the 1950 ' s .  There the State gave a syn­
dicate of Australian and American investors an option on 1, 500 , 000 
acres at 45 cents an acre. The syndicate was to develop the land and 
sell to settlers at a price allowing for a fair return on the invest­
ment. The program collapsed, however, because in its haste for quick 
profits , the company developed the land too rapidly. In 1959 the State 
withdrew the syndicate ' s  option and began to dispose of the land itself . 
In 1960 Western Australia signed a contract with another private 
group which agreed to spend $4, 600, 000 to develop 1 , 50 0 , 000 acres by 
1974. As of 1967, the plan was working successfully. Campbell hopes 
that better use can be made of private development companies because 
capital is short at �resent, and these companies provide access to 
American investors. 2 
Farmers have a high degree of freedom of operation in Australia. 
The government does not strictly enforce its right to exact sound farm 
practices from its lessee s ,  although it does demand removal of vermin 
and noxious weeds. And here , as in Canada and New Zealand, experts 
such as Campbell want the government to supervise more closely free­
holders as well as leaseholders ,  but because farmers have more votes 
than agricultural economi st s ,  it is doubtful if these recommendations 
will have any more effect than similar suggestions by Wood in Alberta. 29 
In conclusion--it appears that in the future ,  credit facilities for 
farmers will continue to be less than ideal, and that while the States 
will continue to develop land, private companies will become more impor­
tant. Farmers who have , or can obtain, capital needed for development 
28T . P. Field, Post-War Land Settlement in Western Australia (Lex­
ington, Kentucky: University--of"""Kentucky Press, 1963), pp. 11, 12 , 43 ; 
S .  F.  Harris , Director, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Connnonwealth 
of Australia (letter , 21 August 1968) ; Campbell, Agriculture in the 
Australian Econonzy-, p. 181 ; Campbell, "Current Is sues in Australian 
Land Policy," p. 7. 
29campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Economy, p. 183 ; Commit­
tee on the Northern Territory, p. 155 . 
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will be most likely to secure land. Also , because present limits on 
farm size prevent a desirable income level for the farm family, it 
seems safe to predict that size limitations will be revised upward. 
Individual States 
' 
Because there is some variation in land policy among the various 
States ,  it seems best to discuss a representative group, including 
Queensland, the Northern Territory, Western Australia , and New South 
Wales .  
Queensland 
Queensland, alone among the Australian States ,  has a tradition of 
favoring the leasehold over the freehold and resuming land for closer 
settlement. Of its 427 million acres only 6 percent are alienated, 
and 87 percent are leased. Except for a three-year period, the State 
sold no Crown land between 1916 and 1957. It disposed of lands for 
intensive agriculture by perpetual lease. In 1957, however , in order 
to attract more investment, it began to sell land again and permitted 
the conversion of perpetual leases to the freehold. It has continued 
to liberalize its laws , even permitting the conversion of grazing 
leases. 
At present there are three major methods of obtaining land for 
intensive agriculture in Queensland. The two most prevalent are free­
holding and perpetual lease .  Under both tenures  a settler may acquire 
usually no more than 2500 acres although he can obtain up to 5000 acres 
if he is willing to spend at least 10 dollars an acre on land improve­
ment. The selling price of public land, whether purchased outright or 
secured by conversion of a perpetual lease ,  is based on the unimproved 
value of the land. The price set is to be paid in annual installments 
without interest. Both freehold and �erpetual lease tenures have resi­
dence requirements . Rents for perpetual leases are 2.5 percent of the 
capital value of the land, and the rents are reviewed every 10 years .  
A third tenure i s  the Settlement Farm Lease, which is designed for 
semi-arable lands used for mixed farming and grazing. It obligates the 
lessee to cultivate a specified area within a specified time. Its term 
is 30 years with the rental review�d every 10 years. The lessee must 
observe residence requirements and may convert the lease to a freehold. 
At present the most favored agricultural areas have been free­
holded. Very little land remains for intensive agriculture because 
Queensland prefers to develop potentially arable land for stockgrowing 
in view of the current world market prices .  In general , there seems 
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to be little dissatisfaction with Queensland's land policy , although 
there has been some criticism of the government's policy regarding 
compensation for improvements .  While the government pays for struc­
tural improvements, it does not compensate the lessee for the clearing 
costs which in more primitive areas are quite high. Critics have 
charged that this lack of compensation retards development. 30 
The Northern Territory 
The Northern Territory is the most arid region of Australia and 
grants very little land for intensive agriculture. Less than 1 per­
cent of its 333 million acres is alienated or private land. Virtually 
all of its occupied land is held on lease. Of these 140 , 000 , 000 lease­
hold acres , only 143 , 000 are held on agricultural leases,  and much of 
this land is held under a mixed farming-grazing lease. Agricultural 
leases are perpetual with a review of the rental every 10 year s ,  al­
though there is a ceiling beyond which the rent may not be raised . 
The lessee is obliged to fulfill a residence requirement. 
The Commonwealth has tried to stimulate the development of the 
Northern Territory's unpromising land for intensive agriculture. It 
remits the lessee's rent for the first 21 years or his lifetime, 
whichever is shorter . In 1956 it introduced the Agricultural Develop­
ment Lease which appeals to private development companies. The devel­
oper's term may not exceed 30 years , and he must subdivide all or part 
of his land for agricultural leases .  He is , however , entitled to 
compensation for improvements .  The Committee to Inquire into the 
Prospects for the Development of Agriculture in the Northern Territory 
recommended shifting from the perpetual lease to freeholding in order 
to attract new capital for agricultural development and to provide 
security for settlers seeking loans. The Commonwealth now permits land 
to be freeholded, subject to restrictions, some of which are uncommonly 
30Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics , Queensland Office, 
Queensland Yearbook , 1966 ( Brisbane : Queen's Printer, 1966) , p. 139 ; 
V .  B. Sullivan, Digest of the Land Laws of Queensland ( Brisbane : Queen's 
Printer, 1968) , pp. 1-13; W. A. T. Summerville,  " Settling Brigalow 
Lands , "  Queensland Agricultural Journal 88 ( December 1962) , p .  705; W. 
Bott, "Plough Moves into the Goondivindi District, "  gueensland Agri­
cultural Journal 89 (May 1963) , p. 292; Secretary of Land Administration 
Commission, Department of Lands , Queensland ( letter, 23 August 1968) ; 
Wadham , Australian Farming, p. 76. 
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rigid. It forbids selling land to an incorporated company and limits 
the maximum area one person may hold to 20 ,480 acres .  It also does not 
permit the new owner to transfer or sometimes even to mortgage his land 
without official consent, and it limits the purchase period to no more 
than 20 years . 
Freedom of operation is the rule in the Northern Territory, al­
though the Committee recommended that the government' make more use of 
its power to enforce good farming practice. 31 
Western Australia 
Western Australia has a strong freehold tradition. Under its 
1893 Homestead Act, it granted 160 acres free to settlers .  The pro­
vision remains in the current Land Act, passed originally in 1933 , al­
though it is a dead letter since the best land has long since been 
taken. The major lease for intensive agriculture is the Conditional 
Purchase Lease. Purchase payments are spread over 25 to JO years and 
extensions are permitted. A Conditional Purchase Lease is limited to 
5000 acres. The State ordinarily requires the lessee to develop half 
of the land within 11 years .  
In Western Australia , as elsewhere , the trend since World War II 
has been toward making ownership easier. In 1951 the State allowed 
war veterans , who were holding perpetual leases under the War Service 
Land Settlement Scheme , to purchase in fee simple after 10 years. In 
1960 it amended this to permit freeholding in less than 10 years. 32 
New South Wales -- ---
In its early years New South Wales '  land policy oscillated between 
the perpetual lease and the freehold. The freehold system is currently 
dominant although the State grants farm lands on perpetual leases with 
the right to convert to the freehold. The land legislation is compli­
cated by the fact that the State does not administer all of its lands . 
JlCommittee on the Northern Territory, pp. 151-7 ; Commonwealth 
Department of the Interior, "Land for Settlement in the Northern Ter­
ritory,"  unpublished manuscript (February 1968) , pp. 1, 7 .  
32T . P .  Field, Post-War Land Settlement, pp. 10-11, 55-58 ; Connnon­
wealth Bureau of Cen;us-and Statistics, Western Australia Office , West­
ern Australia Yearbook , 12.§1. ( Perth : Queen' s  Printer , 1967) pp. 235-
238 , 242-244. 
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The grazing lands in the western part of the State are administered 
by the Western Lands Commission and those in irrigation areas by the 
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission. 
Public land leases in New South Wales are held under the Agri­
cultural Holdings Act of 1941 which governs both private and public 
leases . The Act was based on England' s  Agricultural Holdings Act of 
1923 and is , by far, Australia ' s  most ambitious attempt to protect 
the tenant. While earlier laws granted the tenant fixity of tenure ,  
freedom to improve , and freedom t o  operate , they also allowed him to 
renounce those rights. Many landlords required the tenant to relin­
quish these rights, especially compensation for improvements .  The 
1941 Act forbids the tenant to contract away these rights. The New 
South Wales Agriculture Holdings Act also protects the tenant ' s  right 
to compensation for such items as hay and straw stored on the farm at 
the end of the lease , to any increased value of the holding resulting 
from a higher standard of farming than required, and for disturbance 
of tenure. If the landlord effects improvements himself , he may not 
charge the tenant an annual rent of more than 5 percent of his cost. 
The law also protects the landlord from the cost of unnecessary im­
provements made by the tenant. The tenant may practice any form of 
cropping he desires and cannot waive this right. However, the land­
lord is entitled to compensation if the tenant injures his land.33 
Campbell notes that, despite its scope , the Act has fallen some­
what short of expectations : 
The chief defect • • • is that both the provisions covering 
payment of compensation to tenants and those requiring ade­
quate notice to quit have generally proved ineffective in the 
case of verbal agreements. This is because the Act conflicts 
with the seventeenth century English Statute of Frauds which 
applies equally in Australian law and which provides that any 
agreement not performed within one year must be in writing if 
it is to be enforceable . Unfortunately, verbal agreements are 
rather prevalent, and landlords themselves are disposed to 
avoid written contracts under present circumstances .  There 
is also mounting agitation by landlords for amendment of the 
Act on the ground that the legislation as it now stands 
makes it excessively difficult to dismi�s inefficient and 
incompetent tenants and share farmers .34 
33A .  W. S.  Moodie , "Farm Tenancy in New South Wales--The Agri­
cultural Holdings Act, 1941, and its Application,"  �ricultural Gazette 
of New South Wales 54 ( 1943) , pp. 206, 209, 261, 2 , 266, 308 . 
34Campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Econoszr, pp. 176-7. 
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Grazing Leases 
While Australians prefer freeholds for intensive agriculture, they 
pref er leaseholds for grazing lands. The Committee to Inquire into the 
Prospects for Agriculture in the Northern Territory expressed the pre­
vailing view when it recommended retaining the leasehold on pastoral 
land for the immediate future to prevent overgrazing ' and other mal­
practices and to protect the State from selling land at very low prices. 
A variety of tenures is used for disposing of Crown lands for 
grazing as illustrated by the land law of Queensland. The State em­
ploys the Pastoral Lease in the remote areas where more than 45 ,000 
acres are needed for a living area. The term is generally no longer 
than 30 years with rent adjustments at 10-year intervals. The State 
also grants a Pastoral Development Lease where costly improvements are 
needed to improve carrying capacity and productivity. The Pastoral 
Lease and Pastoral Development Lease are the only two without limita­
tions on the amount of land that can be held without prohibitions 
against corporation farming and without residence requirements. They 
are, however, the only two leases in which the State retains the right 
to resume a portion of the land before expiration, a right that may be 
exercised over as much as one-third of the land after 15 years. 
Two other popular holdings are the Preferential Pastoral Holding 
Lease and the Grazing Homestead Lease. Both are designed for more 
closely settled areas. The Preferential Pastoral Holding Lease is 
generally granted for land on the fringe of closely settled areas or 
for poorer quality Crown Land within these areas. The maximum area 
that may be held under this tenure is ordinarily 60 ,000 acres. The 
Grazing Homestead Lease is limited to a maxi.mum of 45 , 000 acres al­
though this ceiling can be raised to 60 ,000 acres. Both leases exclude 
corporations and impose residence requirements. Grazing leases also 
often require that livestock be limited to reasonable carrying capac­
ity. However, both leases provide considerable security of tenure in 
that the government may not resume land before expiration of the lease 
term. 
In all of its leases Queensland has made an effort to mitigate 
the tenant ' s uncertainty near the end of his tenure . It permits him 
to surrender his land at any time within the last 10 years of his term 
for a new lease. Although the lessee often must relinquish some land 
for closer settlement in the new lease, he has the advantage of a more 
secure tenure in the remaining area. 
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Queensland' s  leasing policy for grazing lands is typical of that 
of the other Australian States. In the even more sparsely developed 
States of South and Western Australia, however, grazing leases run for 
still longer periods--up to 99 years .  The ranches are much larger--a 
ranch of 75 , 000 acres is considered a small grazing unit. Some stations 
may include as much as 420 , 000 acres .  Annual rentals average $2.25 per 
square mile. Australian graziers seem well satisfied with their condi­
tions. An American visitor in 1958 observed that most of the operators 
were well educated and efficient. As a result, they enjoyed a high 
standard of living despite their remote locations. He concluded that 
these lessees enjoyed "an unusual security of tenure."  In the light of 
the waning enthusiasm for closer settlement and smaller living areas , 
it appears that Australian ranchers will become even more secure in the 
foreseeable future. 35 
35sullivan, pp. 1-13 ; Royale K .  Pierson, "Public Land Grazing 
Down Under, "  Our Public Lands 7 ( April 1958 ) ,  pp. 4-5, 12-14. 
III . NEW ZEALAND LAND POLICIES 
Much of New Zealand' s public land policies are not relevant to 
intensive agriculture since its agricultural economy is based primarily 
on cattle and sheep grazing . As of 1963 , it devoted only 406 , 000 acres 
to cereal production and 813 , 000 acres to grain, root, and other crops . 
I 
Of New Zealand ' s  40 million acres of occupied land, 22 million 
acres are privately held while 18 million acres, or 45 percent, are 
public lands belonging to the Crown. Of the 18 million acre s ,  2 . 6  
million acres are held under 5 , 000 Renewable Farm Leases and 0 . 5  million 
acres under 1400 deferred payment farm licens e s .  The Renewable Farm 
Lease is used to dispose �f cropland and can be converted to a freehold. 
Cropland is also sold for cash or deferred payments .  The typical farm 
lease runs for JJ years and may be renewed. The basic land law, the 
Land Act of 1948 , specified that rentals shall be 4 . 5  percent and 
deferred freehold payments 4 . 62 percent per year. However, in 1956 
both rates were eliminated, and charges are left to the discretion of 
the Land Settlement Board. 
The history of New Zealand ' s  public land policies is similar to 
that of other nineteenth century frontier regions such as Canada , 
Australia, and the United States in that it originally stressed sell­
ing the land to encourage private settlement . In 1894, however,  with 
the Liberal-Labor Party in power, the government became more discrim­
inating in its land grants and also began to resume land from the large 
private estates for closer settlement, a policy which is still con­
tinued. The Liberal-Labor government also favored the perpetual lease 
over freeholding. But the fee simple tradition was so strong that the 
government granted no more perpetual leases after 1907 .  However ,  some 
6000 granted before 1907 still exist today. The pressure of the small 
farmers continued, and in 1912 the Reform Party returned to power to 
extend the right to freehold Crown lease s .  Since 1912 the trend to­
ward f reeholding has continued uninterrupted to the present time and 
meets with general approva1. J6 
36Horace Belshaw, "Land Tenure and the Problem of Tenurial Reform 
in New Zealand , "  Family Farm Policy, ed. Joseph Ackerman and Marshall 
Harris ( Chicago: University of Chicago Pre s s ,  1947) , pp. 175-80 ; New 
Zealand Department of Statistics, New Zealand Official Yearbook (Well­
ington : Government Printer , 1964) , pp. 286, 288 ; R. J .  MacLachlan, 
"Land Administration in New Zealand , "  address read before the 1967 
Conference of the New Zealand Institute of Valuers , pp. 9-11. 
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During the 1960s farmers charged the government with placing ex­
cessive valuations on its land, to which the government responded by 
appointing a special investigating committee that reported in 1968. J? 
The Committee recommended several changes for Crown lands. Noting 
that the 33-year lease in a ·  period of rising land values unfairly 
discriminated against the Crown, it suggested that charges be reviewed 
every 11 years .  To soften the effect of this change, it suggested 
that the Crown charge 0 . 5  percent less than the prevailing interest 
rate. 
The 1968 Committee recommended that perpetual leases be converted 
into freeholds although it did not specify how this should be done. 
The Committee also recommended instituting a purchase lease, already 
in use in some Australian States .  This purchase lease requires no 
deposit but calls for an annual fee which includes the purchase price 
and rent. The Committee hoped that this leas e ,  which is similar to a 
long-term mortgage, would meet the needs of settlers for greater 
security of tenure. 38 
The 1968 Committee also suggested changes in the government ' s  
fees for converting a lease into a freehold. At present the govern­
ment does not credit a lessee with the market value of his low rental 
lease.  This low rental during a period of rising land values consti­
tutes an asset which the lessee can realize by selling the lease. Al­
though earlier land laws recognized this as the lessee ' s  asset when 
calculating the freeholding charge , current legislation does not. The 
1968 Committee recommended the amending of the Land Act of 1948 to 
allow the lessee to deduct this asset from the purchase price if he 
should convert to the freehold. 
As noted earlier,  the 1968 Committee recommended that perpetual 
leases be discontinued. Since these leases--actually 99-year leases-­
are relics of the 1894-1907 era when land values were Illllch lower than 
today, the rents charged are extremely low. Yet the Committee offered 
no advice on how to induce these lessees to freehold, and it is doubt­
ful that they will voluntarily give up their comfortable situation 
without substantial inducement. 
3?Report of the Committee of Investigation into Rentals and Free­
holdings of Crown Leases (Wellington: Government Printer ,  19b8J, p. 14. 
Hereafter cited as 111968 Committee . "  
38Mac1achlan, p.  1 2 ;  New Zealand Department of Statistics , pp. 286, 
288 ; 1968 Committee, pp. 16 , 18 . 
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It should also be noted that, unlike the Canadian Province of 
Saskatchewan, New Zealand makes no provision for reducing rents in 
the event of a crop failure or low prices ,  However , New Zealand' s 
climate is stable enough so that crop fluctuations are not a serious 
problem. 39 
Aside from fair rents there has not been much of a problem on the 
public lands of New Zealand. Fixity of tenure is generally guaranteed 
by the standard 33-year lease with the right to renew for another 33 
years.  In some cases,  generally for conservation reasons , the govern­
ment reserves the right of renewal and limits the lease ' s  length. 
The Crown also permits the lessee the right to convert to the free­
hold and the right to sell the lease. On this latter point, the Com­
mittee ruefully noted that the great demand for land caused many set­
tlers to lease land at rental rates equal to those being paid for free­
holds and also to accept the added risk of increased rates at renewal 
time . 40 
Compensation for improvements is standard in Crown leases.  The 
lessee may purchase Crown improvements at any time (with the approval 
of the Land Settlement Board) in cash or on a deferred payments basis . 
The lessee is responsible for maintaining the government ' s  improve­
ments and must insure Crown property. 
The 1968 Committee did find some confusion and discontent among 
lessees with government owned improvements . Although these improve­
ments are not always mentioned or clearly defined in the lease ,  their 
value is included in the rent. Under the 1948 Land Act the lessor is 
entitled to the current value of his unexhausted improvements .  The 
government, therefore, has a problem in determining its unexhausted 
improvements and in valuing them at current prices.  Moreover, if the 
lease changes hands , there is often considerable confusion over the 
ownership of various improvements and also disagreement over the 
amount of compensation to be paid. The 1968 Committee sided with the 
lessee and recommended that the government sell the improvements at 
their value to the lessee rather than at their current value. It 
argued that although the Crown would lose the increased value , it 
would at least s�ve the time and money spent trying to prove the value 
of improvements .  1 
391968 Committee ,  pp. 15-16 ; Belshaw, Family Farm Policy, p. 201. 
40New Zealand Department of Statistics , p .  298 ; 1968 Committee, 
p. 20 . 
411968 Committee ,  pp. 17-18. 
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Historically, capital has been less of a problem for New Zealand 
farmers on public land than for farmers in the Canadian Prairie Prov­
inces.  The goverrunent' s  rural loan program dates back to 1894 and has 
been improved steadily over the years .  A milestone in its development 
was the Marginal Lands Act of 1950 under which the government provides 
advice and loans to farmers needing capital to develop marginal lands 
but who lack sufficient security to borrow from normal lending in­
stitutions . 
The goverrunent itself has long maintained a program to develop 
marginal lands . In the 1941-1966 period it developed 1 . 8  million 
acres on which it settled 4, 160 individuals , J , 500 of whom were ex­
servicemen. Of this land JO percent was owned by the Crown, 60 per­
cent was private land acquired voluntarily for closer settlement and 
10 percent was private land acquired under compulsion. The impetus 
for public land development came from the veterans settlement program 
which virtually ceased in the early sixties .  But the government be­
lieved that economic benefits justified continuing the program, and 
the Crown is proceeding to develop another one million acres for at 
least 1,500 settlers . 
Since the goverrunent makes many improvements on the land, it 
keeps control until it recovers the costs. It not only constructs 
houses and other farm buildings ,  but it also seeds and fertilizes 
gras slands. The government retains the land until the grazing capac­
ity is firmly established, and meanwhile it markets the produce . In 
the mid-sixties the Crown' s  revenue from its land development program 
in a typical year was $6.2 million of which $4.8 million was derived 
from the sale of farm products , and only $1.4 million from time pay­
ments on land and improvements .  The government relinquishes the land 
only when it is convinced that the incoming farmer can make a living 
from the start. The units granted vary from 500 t� 800 acre s .  Vir­
tually all of this new land is devoted to grazing. 2 
A popular method for settling ex-servicemen after World War II 
was to employ them for wages on land being developed and to allot them 
a section of this land when the development was completed. When the 
emphasis shifted to settling civilians in the 1960s , the government 
stressed financing the settler over and above his deposit of 10 per­
cent of the total value of the land, improvements,  and stock. 
42 C .A .  Mcilroy , 11How the State ' s  Land Development Program Meets 
the Challenge of Change , 11 Service (New Plymouth, Summer 1966) , pp. 
4-9. 
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The Crown' s land development program is popular. A recent criti­
cism has had nothing to say about improvements or capital availability 
but has come from South Islanders who feel that th� government has slighted them in favor of developing North Island. 3 
As in the other areas studied, the New Zealand government does 
not interfere significantly with the lessees ' operations but has tried 
to avoid this problem largely by screening out undes1rable applicants.  
The 1968 Coilllllittee recommended that the government reject applicants 
who are so heav44y indebted that they might not follow sound conserva­
tion practices .  
In sum, New Zealand has disposed of public land for intensive 
agriculture for the past 60 years through the freehold, with leasing 
a temporary expedient . Generally, the government ' s  leasing policy has 
been satisfactory. The main complaint has recently come from farmers 
disturbed at the high evaluations of public lands, and this complaint 
appears to be near a solution. 
As for grazing lands, New Zealand--like Saskatchewan, Alberta, 
Australia, and the United States--prefers to lease them. There are 
two basic leases , the Pastoral Lease for 33 years with a right of the 
renewal and a Pastoral Occupation License which runs for a term of up 
to 21 years and carries neither a claim to the land itself nor the 
right of renewal. Rentals for pastoral leases varied from $1-3 a 
square mile at 1958 prices,  but the lessee is ordinarily required to 
make annual improvements such as fencing, water development, and tree 
planting. The pastoral lessee is entitled to compensation for perma­
nent improvements ,  but the holder of a Pastoral Occupation License has 
no such claim unless the Land Settlement Board grants an exception or 
unless the license is renewed. As of 1963 there were 448 Pastoral 
Leases covering 6 . 8  million acres and .54 Pastoral Occupation Licenses 
covering 0 . 5  million acres .45 
43 McLachlan, pp. 10 , 13 , 14; Department of Lands and Survey, 
Annual Report, 1968 (Wellington : Government Printer, 1968) , p. 5 .  
44 McLachlan, p .  13 ; 1968 Coilllllittee, p .  23 . 
45New Zealand Department of St�tistics , pp. 98 , JOO ; Pierson, 
" Public Land Grazing Down Under , "  pp. 4-5 , 12-14. 
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IV. LAND DISPOSAL POLICIES IN THE NETHERLANDS 
The only goverrunent studied which stresses leasing rather than 
selling public lands for intensive agriculture is the Netherlands . 
Virtually all of its public lands consists of "polders" that have 
been reclaimed from the North Sea at great cost. Because of this 
cost the government seeks to realize the greatest possible return on 
its investment. Apparently it believes this can be mo� readily 
achieved by leasing than by selling the land outright. 
When completed in the 1970s the polders will yield 500 , 000 acres 
of additional farm land to a nation which now possesses only five mil­
lion acres . Because Netherlanders farm very intensely, the individual 
plots on the polders are limited to between 30 and 120 acres , with 70 
percent consisting of 60 acres or les s.  As in the other States 
studied, the Netherlands has attempted to define an adequate farm size 
for leasing the redistributing land. Presently, there are two schools 
of thought on the subject. One advocates a size of 15 to 25 acres 
which will allow an individual farmer "to utilize his entire capacity 
for work in a rational way . "  The other faction favors about 35-38 
acres to provide sufficient work for two men. It assumes that the 
farmer will be aided by his sons. Both methods have been applied by 
local boards under the Land Consolidation Act of 1954. In general, 
the smaller farms are for market gardening while the larger farms are 
livestock or dairy farms . 47 
Since the Netherlands has no crop share leases , even under pri­
vate leasing, all rents are payable in cash; however, the rents are 
low. Because of the tremendous demand for land since World War II , 
the government has felt it necessary to hold down all land rents by 
rent controls . The rents charged are based on soil productivity and 
also on the value of Crown improvements, which are quite extensive . 
46 Public Relations and Information Department of the Netherlands 
Ministry of Transportation and Waterstaat , From Fisherman' s  Paradise 
to Farmer ' s  Pride (The Hague : Netherlands Information Service ,  1959) , 
p.  52 . 
47Franklin J .  Reis s ,  "New Lands" unpublished and undated paper, 
Agricultural Economics Department, University of Illinois, (written 
since 1958) ; Ministry of Transportation and Waterstaat, From Fisher­
man' s  Paradise to Farmer ' s  Pride, p. 48 ; S .  Herweyer, "The Reclamation 
of , Distribution of, and Settlement in New Cultivatable Land111 Nether­lands Journal of Agricultural Science 5 (August 1957) , p. 17u. 
62 
The government not only reclaimed the land but also constructed the 
farm houses . Rents range from £ 80 an acre-year for sandy and peat 
soil to .£ 165 an acre-year in the heavy loam soil zone. Rents may be 
reviewed every three years,  but there is no adjustment for changes in 
commodity prices .  The tenant may appeal the lessor ' s  decision to the 
local Land Chamber whose rulings may in turn be appealed to the Central 
Land Chamber. 48 
A lack of capital, which handicaps lessees in the other countries 
included in this study, is not a severe problem in the Netherlands . 
Since there is a tremendous demand for polder land, the government sets 
up rigid requirements for tenants , including capital resources .  It 
demands that the applicant have available £ 6407 acre or .£38 ,400 for 
a 60-acre plot ; 25 percent of the total must be the applicant ' s  own 
money, but up to 50 percent may be borrowed from relatives or others ,  
and up to 25 percent may be in the form of loans from the local Farmers 
Credit Bank with repayment guaranteed by the Central Farmers Credit 
Bank. 
The government employs additional criteria in selecting tenants ;  
since it is really establishing whole new communities on the reclaimed 
land, it seeks a population balanced by age , religion, and provincial 
origin. It also gives preference to applicants who are abandoning 
uneconomic farm units or who have lost farms in the public interest, 
for road construction, etc .49 
The land is leased for 12 years ,  the nunimum period for land with 
buildings under the Land Rent Act of 1958 that regulates public and 
private leasing arrangements.  The lease is  automatically extended for 
six-year periods unless either party gives notice . Netherlands law 
allows the government to evict the tenant only for poor husbandry or 
if land is to be used for a public purpose.  The tenant' s  heir suc­
ceeds him, but he must meet certain requirements .  Although the State 
is considering leasing the land for longer terms , the present system 
seems to guarantee the tenant reasonable security of tenure. 
48Reiss , "New Lands , "  p .  4; Cornelius D.  Scheer, "The Place of 
Tenancy in the Agriculture of the Netherlands , "  Land Tenure ,  eds . 
Kenneth Parsons , Raymond J.  Penn, and Philip M.  Raup (Madison: Uni­
versity of Wisconsin Press,  1956) , pp. 520-1;  Foreign Information 
Service, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries ,  Agriculture in the 
Netherlands (The Hague : Government Publishing and Printing Office, 
1962), p. 52 ; Ministry of Transportation and Waterstaat, p.  48.  
49Ministry of Transportation and Waterstaat, p.  54. 
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The government owns the major improvements such as the farm house, 
and is responsible for their basic maintenance. Under Netherlands law 
the tenant is responsible for minor repairs and provides his own 
machinery and livestock. A�l improvements are insured by their res­
pective owners .  Under the Land Act of 1958, the tenant receives reim­
bursement for his improvements .  Compensation may not exceed the ap­
preciated or increased value of the farm. The amount of use the tenant 
obtained from his improvements is deducted from his reimbursement. 
Because the government owns the major improvements on the polders, no 
great problem of compensation exists. 
The State apparently does not impose any more rigid conditions on 
farming practices than do most nations . It should be remembered that 
the initial selection grocess almost always sifts reliable tenants from 
a host of applicants . 5 In general , the government ' s  leasing policies 
are well received. 
50Ministry of Transportation and Waterstaat, p. 52 ; Scheer, The 
Place of Tenancy, pp. 520 ff. 
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V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Leaseholds and freeholds are widely used methods of disposing of 
public lands in Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada , and in Australia , New 
Zealand , and the Netherlands . The granting of freehold estates is the 
trend for cropland (except in the Netherlands where almost all public 
land is leased) while leaseholds remain common for grazing lands. When 
leaseholds are available for cropland, they are generally for long terms 
or are perpetual leases . Since more status is attached to land owner­
ship than to leasing, the freehold is the overwhelming choice of farm­
ers , and in many of the Provinces and States the leasehold can be con­
verted into a freehold. The provision for converting is a response to 
the fact that farmers feel the need of security or fixity of tenure if 
they are to be free to improve and to operate in a manner that benefits 
both private and public interests . 
The question of fair rents is a constant one, and there appears 
to be no entirely satisfactory answer . Sale of the land to the farmer 
is the most popular disposition method, but it too presents problems 
of land valuation. Various methods of determining value are in use. 
The sale by sealed bids or open auction is perhaps the least burden­
some from an administrative standpoint . Its dangers are that through 
ignorance of land values ,  over optimism, or desperation, the farmer may 
bid more than can be paid for with the income of the farm. 
Credit for improvements on both freeholds and leaseholds is also 
a problem. The down payment on the freehold frequently absorbs capital 
needed for improvements .  The leasehold also has the disadvantage of 
not being as good security as a freehold for improvement loans . 
Farm size has been a major concern of settlers ,  and they have 
agitated for increases in the acreage of public land grants . In recent 
years most of the governments have raised the acreage limits to allow 
units to become more economically adequate .  In Alberta the maximum 
land grant was increased from 320 to 800 acres ,  and a similar revision 
has been made in Saskatchewan. 
Whether to dispose of land by leasehold or freehold also involves 
the basic question: can farmers be trusted, or induced, to handle the 
land under a freehold so that both private and public interests are 
better served than under a leasehold? Under the leasehold the State 
can reserve control over land use by provisions in the lease;  however, 
whether this right to control can be effectively exercised is another 
matter. The evidence that the State can prevent abuse of land by 
lease provisions is not impressive . 
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C H A P T E R  8 
LAN D P O L I C Y  
K .  0 .  C A M P B E L L  
University o f  Sydney 
Land policy loomed very large in public thinking and action in Australia 
in its ea!·ly days. The colony of South Australia was in fact founded in 1 836 
as a practical test of Edwanl Gibbon Wakefield's particular theory of land 
settlernent.1 Jn the nineteenth century, revenue from land sales was for a long 
time a major source of public revenue. Parliamentary elections were won or 
lost on land policy issues. 
Today, the administration of land is essentially concerned with canying 
out settled policy. It is true that in some Australian States the platforms of 
the political parties still reflect the beliefs of 50 years ago that subdi\'ision 
of pre-existing holdings (closer settlement) is the major means of promoting 
rural development. Hut as the public bec->111es more fully aware of the 
poten tialities for agricultural expansion inherent in recent advances in agri· 
cultural technology, it is likely that this older emphasis on land redistribu­
tion as a means to development will be superseded. 
The Australian Federal go\'ernment as such has no land policy, except i n  
s o  far a s  i t  i s  directly in\'oh·cd iu the administration o f  the i'\orthern Terri­
tory and the overseas territories of Papua and New Guinea. Upon the federa­
tion o[ the Australian States in 1 90 1 ,  the administration of land was one area 
of public responsibility which was left i·.1 �he hands of the State go\'ernments. 
All of these States at that time had lands departments as constituent parts 
of their administrative machinery a·nd this situation still prevails today. 
Despite i�s lack of constitutional authority, the Commonwealth govern· 
ment can nevertheless exercise some indirect innt:ence upon the direction of 
land policy. This arises mainly from the limited financial autonomy of the 
States in recen t  decades. The mark of the Commonwealth go\'ernment upon 
land policy was most clearly seen with respect to the scheme for the settle­
ment of ex·sen·icemen after 'Vorkl War II, which is discussed later. But the 
Federal government exercises a more continuous influence in a financial con· 
J. Edward Gibbon Wakefield, A Leiter from Sydney, London 1829, republished by J. :'IL 
Dent and Sons, London 1929. For an evaluation of the Wakefield doctrine sec R. C. Mills, 
The Colo11is11tio11 of A wtrnlia, 18:!9·/S./2, Sidgwick and Jackson, London 1915; and S. H. 
Roberu, History of Awtrnlian I.And Settlemwt, :'\Iacmillan, Melbourne 192-!. 
From Agriculture 2:l � Austr�lian Econ�my� e
d. D. B. 
1�Villi3Ills (Sidney, Austruia, i967), by nermission of 
Sidney University Press (price , $8 . 50) . 
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text. Loan funds used by th� States to finance closer settlement activities and · 
for other purposes arc reviewed aunually on a federal basis at the meeting of 
the Loan Council, comprised of federal and State finance ministers. Major 
schemes for land development are also subject to federal review, i f  federal 
finance is required, as i t  usually is. Apart from its participation in land settle­
ment activities, the Federal government levies land taxes and estate duties. 
These were originally conceived as a means of discouraging the aggregation 
of land into large holdings.2 
LAND OWNERSHIP 
Australia is probably unique among the western countries in that a high 
proportion of its land is still in pu�lic ownership. Table 8-1 shows in abso-
lute and relati\'e terms the areas alienated and unalienated in the various 
States in 1 964. These figu:·cs nc,w change very little from year to year. The 
.Table 8-1 
Ownership of Land, 1964 
Private lands Public lands 
Stale or In process Ltased or Total 
Territory Alienated of 
alienation 
licensed Other a area 
m. acres m .  acres m. acres m. acres m. acres 
N.S.W. 58 · 9  7 · l 1 1 3 · 3  1 8 · 8  198 · 0  
Vic. 31  · 8  2 ·4 6 ·  l 1 6 · 0  56 · 2  
Qld. 26 · 4  3 · 8  369 · 4  27 · 3  426 · 9  
S.A. 1 6 · 0  0 · 4  146 ·4 80 · 5  243 · 2  
W.A. 29 · l 1 4 · 5  246 · 5  331 · 5  624 · 6  
Tas. 6 · 6  0 · 2  1 · 5 8 · 6  1 6 · 9  
N.T. 0 · 3  _b 1 9 1  · 4  141 · 2  333 · 0  
A.C.T. O ·  l _b 0 · 3  0 · 2  0 · 6  
Australia 169 · l 28 · 5  1,074 · 8  627 · 0  1 ,899 · 5  
% % % % % 
N.S.\<\T. 29 · 7  3 · 6  57 · 2  9 · 5  1 00 · 0  
Vic. 56 · 5  4 · 2  1 0 · 9  28 · 4  100 ·0 
Qld. 6 · 2  0 · 9  86 ·5 6 · 4  1 00 · 0  
S.A. 6 · 5  0 · 2  60 · 2  33 · l 1 00 · 0  
W.A. 4 · 7  2 · 3  3 9 · 5  53 · 5  1 00 · 0  
Tas. 39 · l l · 3  8 · 6  5 1  · 0  1 00 · 0  
N.T. O ·  l 57 5 42 · 4  100·0 
A.C.T. 1 0 · 6  6 · 9  47 · 5  35·0 1 00 · 0  
Australia 8 · 9  l · 5  56 · 6  3 3 · 0  1 00 · 0  
a. Land occupied by government agencies, reserved lands, and unoccupied lands. 
b. Not significant. 
SouRc.F. : Tear Book, No 52, 1 956, Bmeau of Census and Statistics. 
2. J. M. C�rbnd, Economic A!pells of Australian I.And Ta'(a/ion, �fclbourne University 
Press, Mclbo11mc 1934. 
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in teresting point is that 1 75 years after the first settlement only 1 0 · 4  per cent 
o[ the total area o[ the country had been alienated or was in process of 
alienation. 
The aliena ted lands, for the most part, are located in the older settled 
areas, Victoria being 1he only State with m ore than half of its lands in 
private o'rncrship. The large acreages of land held under lease from the 
government ;ire loc::acd predominantly in the more sparsely settled, more 
arid pastoral areas of Queensland, "'estern Australia, the Northern Terri­
tory, New South \\'ales and South Australia. 
The various fonns of bnd tenure in the various States are broadly similar, 
the similarity be:ing strongest among the eastern States which originally 
formed part of !'\cw South \\'ales. Even so, the large number of types of 
tenure and Yariety of terms and conditions applying to particular tenures 
make it impossible to proYicle a S\jccinct outline of the country's land Jegis­
Ja ti on. 3 
FREEHOLD TENURES 
There are two types of freehold tenure. The first, which applies to the greater 
part of the alienated lands, al lows a high degree of freedom to the indi­
vidual owner to use or to tr::insfe:r the land ::is he wishes. The government <loes 
retain some control by virtue of the right of eminent domain, the right to 
tax, and the right to institute land-use regulations in the n::imc of resource 
conscrva ti on. 
However, in the case of some of the freehold land acquired in the past 50 
years or so, go,·crnmcnts have a ttached a caveat preventing their transfer to 
persons who already hold more th:m a specified area of Janel. This is true, for 
instance, of lands acquired under conditional purchase tenures and certain 
other tenures in :\:cw South \V:ilcs after 1 909. In other words, some of the 
restrictions which :ipply to lands in process of alien:ition, described in the 
next section, ;ipply equally to some freehold land. 
THE TEXURE OF Lr\:'\DS I� PROCESS OF ALIE�ATION 
The State go,·ernmcnts typically place many conditions upon landholders 
who are in the procc�s of purcha�ing their Janel. Usually there is a limit set 
on the area ,.;hich can be :icguircd, the concept of 'the home m:iinten;mce 
area' or 'Ji, ing are::i' bein6 frcgucntly employed as ::in administrative device 
i n  this connc�iion. Sometimes, ::is with some tenu1es in l'\e\\· South '\'ales, 
there arc, in addition, certain acreai;e maxima :ipplicable to particubr 
regions. In most c:ises also. it is incumbent on the O\rner to Ji,·e on the 
}. The m<'�t s�H<:matic aw:mpt to pr<.>\'idc a n  outline or :\11s1r.iliJn Lind kgislJtion was 
macle by the St1T\l'� Or·Gcncr:ll of \\'ntrrn Amtrali:l, :'-Ir W. \'. Fyfr, in J 9 l 4. This report 
fo1mtd :\11nr\.11rc .\ of the Xi11th R.:port of the R111�l Rccom 1 1 11c1ion Commission, Go\'crn­
mc:nl J>rint<:r, C:inua1a 1!•:6. bu: the 3:1'1l'�t11c� \\'Ctc not puhlished. A mpp!cmcnt:lry 
mimeog1�phtd rt'port enti tk<l 'L1nd Laws a:icl Tenures' co, u ing aml·n<lmcnts up 10 l!l4S 
,,·as issued in 19·t9. 
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property for a t  least five years and to carry out within a prescribed time 
certain improvements such as clearing and fencing. These latter restraints 
sometim.es impose substantial opportunity costs on the settler.4 • 
The principle of the home maintenance area is a pivotal feature of much 
Australian thinking about land tenure. Various expressions of the concept 
are to be found in different Acts. A typical definition would be that used i n  
the New South \·Vales \Vestern Lands Act o f  1949, viz. 'an area which when 
used for the purpose for which it is reasonably fitted would be sufficient for 
the maintenance in average seasons and circumstances of the average family'. 
This concept has been used as a criterion in a number of administrative 
decisions affecting land.s First, it has been used to set the maximum area 
which may be alienated to any one settler whether by a11ocation or as a 
result of transfers from others. By the same token, i t  serves to guide decisions 
on applications to transfer titles. In more re.::ent times, the concept has been 
used in determining the area which may be retained by the original holder 
when land is resumed or surrendered for closer settlcment. Third, i t  has 
been used in closer settlement programmes, particularly since "'orld Vlar II, 
to set the minimum areas to be :1llotted to settlers. As such it became a 
means of preventing excessiYe subdivision by over-enthusiastic State officials. 
The language of the definition is extremely vague and its interpretation 
must necessarily be highly subjective. In practice, the ultimate interpretation 
has to be made by the local administrative units. Commonwealth government 
oversight of land settlement programmes after \\Torld \Var II did encourage 
greater objectivity by forcing State lands departments to resort to more 
precise budgets than they had been wont to use pre\'iously. However, what­
e,·er the degree of objecti\'ity introduced, the criterion clearly sets a welfare 
objective i n  terms of a reasonable level of living and involves no considera­
tion of efficiency. The 'home maintenance area' concept has also been criti­
cized for its scant regard for questions of production variability.a The prob­
lem of the survival of pastoral businesses in .areas of low and irregular rain­
fall is not amenable to solution in terms of average incomes and average 
seasons. 
In addi tion to the various forms of freehold tenure, there are in most States 
several classes of leasehold where the tenant has some right of conversion to 
freehold ten,11 es. This right is hedged about with a whole host of conditions 
not the least of which, usuJlly, is the pro\'ision relating to home mainten· 
:mce areas. 
-/. e.g. I. J. :\!oncricfT and R. C. ?-lauldon, 'The EITcct of L3'1ri Clearing Regulations on 
the Rate of F:in11 Dc\·clop111cnt, A Case S111tly', A 11Jtralia11 journal of Agricultural Econ­
omics, \'ol 7, �o '.?, December 1963. 
5. J. �. Lewis, 'Is the Concept of the !tome ;\faintenancc Arca OlHmodcd?', Australian 
]oumnl of Agricu/1111u/ Eco110111ics, \'ol 7, :-:o 2, Dcc-embc. 1963, !> 9i. 
6. K. 0. Campbell, 'The Ch:illcnge of I· :otluction Instability in ·\1:s1ralian Ag1iculture', 
Aust1alia11 )ouma/ of Agricultural Eco:10111ics, \'ol 2, No l ,  July l�l:;S, p 9. 
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LEASES FROM THE GOVERNMENT 
There is a wide variety of go\'crnment leas�s in operation in the various 
States. They ra!}ge from annual leases to perpetual leases, the majority of 
them being for Jong periods. For most practical purposes, properties which 
are held under perpetual le ... ses are virtually indistinguishable from alien­
ated land. Usually the consent of the responsible minister is required before 
sales or transfers can be effected, but sales (and professional valuations) are 
made as if the pi opertics in question •.·:ci'� freehold. It should be e1_nphasized 
that these leases relate solely to the land and not to the improvements upon it. 
In some of the Jong-term leases, the rentals set are fixed over time. In 
other. cases the rentals are re-appraised from time to time, e.g. at J O-year in­
ten·als. Except where lanci has been made arnilable for closer settlement after 
resumption, the rentals charged are usually much lower than the rentals 
which ,,·ould pre\'ail on a free market. They can be as low as I ·  25 per cent 
of the notified capital value, which may itself be f.xed at a very conservative 
level. In some cases, as in the \Vestern Division of New South "7ales, rentals 
are fixed at so much per sheep carried, the actual amount payable being 
based on the assessed carrying capali ty of the land. 
As might be expected where the prc\'ai ling rentals are well below the 
economic level, the difference tends to be capit .t!izcd into the market value 
of the lease in question. Under certain circumstances, go\'crnments take steps 
to pre\'ent existing tenants from benefiting, at the expense of their successors, 
from what are, in essence, concessional rentals. 
Some of the leaseholds, particularly in Queensland and the Northern Ter­
ritory, are for fixed periods, and ha\'e been criticized for their consequent 
failure to encourage the.maintenance and impro\'ement of the properties in 
question. The Queensland pastoral leases do however gi\'e the outgoing 
lessee the right to retain a portion of his lease cquinlent to a living area. 
Some of the disabilities of the fixed lease may be offset by the incorporation 
of specific proYisions in the lease. These may require the Jessee .to carry out, 
within a defined period, a specific programme of improYemcnts such as 
construction of fences, or sinking artesian bores; or they may require him 
not to o\·erstock the land, and to "·i thhol<l stock from specific sections of the 
property. Until recently, Northern TetTitory leases have e\·en specified a 
minimum rate of stocking. !\Iost leases make proYision for compensating the 
lessee for any impro\'emcnts on the surrender or expiry of the kase, but 
others such as  annual and forest least>s do not. 
PRIVATE LEASING 
Though leasing of rur:il lands from the gO\·ernment is ·.;idespread in Aus­
tralia, leasing from priYate indi\'id11a!� is rather rare, at least by overseas 
standards. In fact i t  is so inconscque·! ! ial that agTiritltur:-tl st:itisticians do 
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not bother to collect inforination on this point. A figure of 2 per c·<'nt of 
rural lands has for many years been #:J.UOted as the extent of private leasiw• , 0 
in 1\ew South '\Talcs. 
Share farming is practised to son<e extent, but  is, by and large, con fined 
to wheat and dairy industries. It  is also found to a more limited extent in the 
potato and tobacco industries. In wheat areas, the landlord typically sup­
plies the land and portion of the seed and fertilizer, the share farmer pio­
viding the remaining inputs. Half of the product usually goes to each, thou;:;h 
in some cases the landlord reserves in addition some grazing rights. There h. 
ho-we\·er, great variation in the proportions of prcdu.ce retained by the ownc:r 
and also i n  the inputs he supplies. This applies particularly to share farm­
ing arrangements in the dairy industry. In some cases the share farmer merely 
proYides his labour and his situation is hardly distinguishable from th:it of 
a p:iid employee. 
Most of the States have attempted to afford some measure of legislati\'e 
protection to agricultural ' tenants. By far the most ambitious of such le�is­
Jation is the ?\cw South Wales Agricultural Hole.lings ,.\ct of 1 9·1 1 .7 Origin:illy 
modelled on the comparable United Kingdom legislation, the Act contains 
provisions covering (i) security of tenure (ii) payment of compensation for 
disturbance (iii) payrnP.nt of compensation for unexhausted impro\'emen� 
(iv) measures for securing agreement between landlord and tenant on 
certain classes of i mpro\'ements (-.') payment of compensation to the landlord 
for deterioration in the Yalue of his holding resulting from the failure of 
the tenant to follow the precepts of good husbandry and (vi) arbitr;i tion on 
the question of fair rents. For arbitration, the Act provides for the con­
stitution of ad hoc committees to which both the landlord and the tenant 
nominate a representati\'e and over which an officer of the Department of 
Agriculture presides. The committees may at any stage secure an opinion 
on any question of law from a judge of the district court. 
Despite its \\'ide-ranging pro,·isions, the Act has fallen some,,·hat short of 
expectations and it  is generally acknowledged to be in need of amendment. 
The chief defect of the legislation from a legal point of Yiew is that both the 
provisions CO\'ering payment of compensation to tenants and those requiring 
adequate notice to quit h a\'e generally pro,·ed inclfecti\'e in the case of 
verbal agreements. This is because the Act conflicts with the sc\'enteenth­
centuq• English Statute of Frauds which applies equally in Australian law 
and which pro\'ides that any agreement not perfonned \\'ithin one year nrn\l 
be in writing if i t  is to be enforceable. Unfortunately verbal agreements arc 
rather pre\'aknt and landlords themseh·es are disposed to arnid \\Titten con­
tracts in the present circumstarices. There is also mounting agitation by land-
7 . .For clctails see A. \V. S. :'.foodie and J. R. Ilntlcr, i:-r.1m Trunm:y in New Soutli Jl'clrs, 
New Soirth \\'ales Dcrariment of Agricnl1u1e, Sydney l!r."1'.?. 
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lords for amendment of the Act on the ground that the legislation as i t  now 
sta�ds makes i t  excessively difficult to dismiss . i nefficient and incompetent 
tenants and share farmers. 
CLOSER SETTLEMENT 
Perhaps the most imponant fea ture of Australian land policy in the present 
century has been t11e policy of closer settlement pursued by the various State 
goYernments. The emergence of this pressure for the subdivision of large 
holdings cannot be full)' appreciated except against the background of earlier 
Australian land policies.s 
1-1 istorically the deYelopment of Australian land policy falls into several 
distinct periods. Initially in the years following on the establishment of the 
first settlement in New South \\'ales in 1788, free grants of land were made 
to induce settlers to come to and stay in the new country. Land was also 
granted to emancipated convicts on condition that a quit rent ,\·as paid after 
a specified period of occupation. By the 1 830s, sy�tems of land grants by 
purchase (or auction) had been introduced. "'ith their i ntroduction i t  proved 
im'possible to confine the so-c;'tlleJ squatters' to �he official limits of settle­
ment and occupation of the hin terland proceeded apace. 
r\ rapid inOux of population follo":cd the discovery of gold in I SS I .  When 
many erstwhile miners began to look to fa�;�1ing as an alternative occupa tion 
after goldmining had lost its attractiveness for them, they found the best 
l:md t1lready occupied by the squatters. Considerable agitation for land re­
form followed and this coincided ,,·ith the establishment of self-government. 
Jn the early I SGOs the new Victorian and New Souih "'ales State parliamcr.ts 
passed legislJtion making ];incl more acr':'ssible to "·ou!d-be settlers and 
encouraging agricul lural activities side by side with large pastoral leases. The 
:\cw South \\7aks Acts of l8GI in troduced the new principle of free selection 
before survey. This legislation led to various abuses such as dummying and 
within a quarter of a century further legislative enactments were necessary 
to remedy the situation. From that time forward the whole emph:isis shifted 
to closer settlement. 
By a series of legislative en:ictments all the States developed machinery 
for resuming large pastoral holdings, subcli\'iding them, and making ilie 
smaller blocks a\'ailable to other settlers usually by a system of sirriple ballot· 
ing. �ot :ill the closer settlement was promoted by compulsory acquisition. 
Provision was made for owners ,·olunt:irily to enter into agreements for the 
suhcliYision of t11eir holdings. Pastoral companies h:iving large holdings i n  
favoured <listricts, particularly those comp:inics with their headquarters over­
seas, haYe been p:irticul:lrly prone to resumption. 
,<;. The cb�sic ,;·01k in thi� fic!J is S. J I .  Rohc11�. op. cit. For :-\cw South \\'ales dcnlop­
mmts sec C. J. ! " in;;, ',\n 0111Ji11c of Closer S.:ulcmcnl in :-\cw Sotllh \\'aks', Rt'l'icw of 
.\f1:1/;c1i11g n::d Agrhu/turnl Economics, \'ol '.?5. Nos 3·4, Scptcmucr·Dcccml>cr 19.'ii. 
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The actual procedure of resumption has on occasions left much to be 
desired. The chief restraint, apart from the administrative one of limited 
staft. has been the a\'ailability of money to finance the purchase of the 
resumed estates and to finance the new settlers. (Traditionally credit for such 
settlers has been provided by the governments themselves, at concessional 
rates of interest.) This means that the pace of closer settlement has varied 
substantially o\·er time, depending inter ulia on the state of the economy, the 
rate a t  which capital has become a\'ailable, the market prospects for rural 
products, the degree of success attending earlier settlements, and the rival 
claims of other public work\ programmes. To safeguard the government 
against paying higher values for estates resumed, the practice has grown up 
of •proclaiming' estates destined for subdi\'ision long before resumption was 
effected. This kept costs of resumption dowi:, but i t  also discouraged further 
priva te inYestment on the properties concerned. The inequities of this system 
are apparently now being realized. In 1 966, the New South Wales govern­
ment announced the lifting of proclamations from a 
'
long list of estates the 
acquisition of which i t  could not finance · for a considerable time to come. 
Lands administrators have in recent decarles been loath to subdivide 
properties where sheep studs are maintained. It is argued that these studs 
require large flocks (and consequently large areas) to work effectively and 
that the perpetuation of the studs is in the national interest. 
Se\·eral attitudes and indeed myths have developed about closer settle­
ment. It was long regarded as one nf tl1t chief means of developing the rural 
industries, and the beneficial effects of subdivision on the adjoining country 
towns \\·ere applauded. I t  was said to be a way of stemming the 'drift to the 
cities' and of providing opportunities for farmers' sons to remain on the land. 
It has also become identified in the public mind as a fitting method of re­
habilitating ex-sen-icemen. After both world wars, emphasis has been put on 
the settlement of ex-sen·icemen to the exclusion of ch'ilian settlers. In fact, 
in such periods, the activity becomes known as 'soldier settlement' rather 
than closer settlement. 
Large numbers of ex-sen·icemen were in fact assisted to acquire properties 
after \Vorld \Var I. EYen before the onset of the Great Depression m:iny of 
these men were in se\'ere economic difficulties. In some cases, they were in­
adequately trained in fanning. Jn other c:ises the holdings on which they 
were placed were too small. In still other cases, soil and :igronomic im·estiga­
tions before settlement had been inadequate. Se\'eral committees of enquiry 
were conducted, and a large amount of public funds was spent in reconstrnct­
ing holdings and rehabilil:iting the scttlers.e 
9. See Commonwealth of Austr:ilia, Report by Mr. ]11stiu Pike 011 LoJScs due to Soldier 
Settlement, Go1ernme11t Printer, Canberra 1929; and Rural Reconstruction Commission, 
Settlement and Employme11t of Returned .'1e11 on the Land, Land Utili:ation and Farm 
Settlement, Fi11a11rial a11d Ero110111ic Reconstruction of Farms (Seco11d, Third and Fourth 
Reports), Gol"ernrnrnt P 1 ; nter, C:inbcrra 194.J. 
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THI:: WAR SERVJCE L.\:'\D SETTLE:\1E�T SCHEr-IE 
The prospect of further pressure for the settlement of ex-servicemen on 
the land after "'orld \Var II led the Commonwealth government to prepare 
in ad,·ancc for such an e\'entuality as part of its postwar reconstruction plans. 
In 1945 a series of agreements was drawn up between the Commonwealth 
go,·ernment and the States covering their respecti\'e financial obligations 
for the acquisition of holdings, the development of these holdings and ad­
,·anccs to sett.lers. In general, the Stat:::s of Queensland, New South "'ales 
and Victoria (the principal States) bore half the cost of most i tems, the re­
maining States (the agen: States) bearing a smaller proportion.to 
The most important feature of the so-called War Ser.-ice Land Settlement 
Scheme was the set of principles enunciated in the course of concluding the 
agreements. It is fair to say that thbe set the stage for the closer settlement 
acti,·ities of the past 20 years. The principles were as follows: 
(i) Settlement is to be undertaken only where economic prospects are 
reasonably sound; and the number .Jf eligible persons to be settled is to be 
determined by the opportunities for settlement and not by the number of 
applicants; 
(ii) Applicants are not to be selected as �:::ttlers unless satisfying a com­
petent authority as to their eligibility, suitability and qualifications for 
settlement under the scheme and their experience of farm work; 
(iii) Holdings are to be of a sizP. sufficient to enable settlers to operate 
efficiently and to earn a reasonable labour income; 
(iv) A suitable eligible person is not to Le precluded by reason only of 
fad. of capital, but  a settler is expected to invest in the holding a reason­
able proportion of his O\\·n financial and other resources; and 
(v) Adequate guidance and technical advice is to be made available to 
settlers through agricultural extension ser\'ices.n 
Under this scheme, all subcli\'isions were examined by the Commonwealth 
government, before any Federal finance was authorized. Special training 
schemes for i n tending settlers were pro\'ided. In some States in accordance 
\rith custom, the blocks a\·ailable \rere allocated by ballot among the persons 
who had applied and "·ere appron:•d for inclusion in the ballot. Though the 
. .\ct authorizing it was dccbrcd constitutionally invalid in 1 919, the scheme 
was continued. Judged on its objectives, the scheme was highly successful in 
marked contrast to the failures following "'orld \Var I. Part of the success, 
no doubt, must be attributed to the improvement of commodity prices which 
JO. for Culler d..::Jils or the scheme sec '\\·u Service LJnd Seulerncnt-Somc Agricultural 
anti Financial Aspcr:s 0f Joint Commom,·ealth·State Legislation', mimco., Bureau of 
:\gric11lt ural Econo .. 1i.:.s, El;<O; :ind Yenr Book, No 37, 19·l6·4i, pp 1 13 - 1 19, Ilurcau of 
Census and Statistics. 
11.  Cornmonwcalth of Australia, :�1ar Service Land Settlemrnt Agreement Act, No 52 of 
1945. 
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occurred in the earl)' years.of the scheme, and which resulted in many of the 
new settlers receiving incomes well in excess of those contemplated. "'hether 
or not the community at large received benefits commensurate with the cost 
of the scheme is another question. 
· 
FARM CONSOLIDATION 
Though the predom inant theme of its land policy has been closer settlement, 
Australia h:is h:id some experience in the reconstruction of uneconomic hold­
ings. This chiefly occurred as a result of the failure of some of the settlement 
schemes of the 1920s and was associated with the wheat industry in particu­
lar. The Commonwealth government assisted the States in a series of salvage 
oper;Hions, knO\rn as marginal wheat area schemes,12 which were undertaken 
mainly in the 1 0  years following tl1e Great Depression. In many cases, a 
writing-do�rn of debts and restructuring of financial obligations were all that 
was im·olvecl. In other u1ses, bankrupt settlers were given a lump sum on 
the condition that they vacated their holdings, their properties were divided 
and the resultant portions were added to those of adjoining property owners 
in order to bring the reconstructed farms up to a size which was believed to 
be economically viable. 
A similar system of reconstruction of farms was recommended in 1960 by 
�e Dairy Industry Committee of Enquiry as a means of eliminating low­
income fam1s from that inclnstry, but the recommendations were not accepted 
by the government of the day.13 
U�SETTLED ISSUES I N  LAND POLICY 
In recent years the emphasis in :\ustralian lands administration has shifted 
primarily to problems associated with fostering the better use of the land 
already in use:. In one sense this was true of the original policy of closer 
settlement, but even this po!i ... y has recen tly been questioned. 
THE PLACE OF CLOSER SETfLDIE::\T 
Several factors haYe been responsible for this re-examination. First, the 
c!evelopment of Amtralian agriculture in the past 1 5  years has led to a realirn­
tion that modern agricultural technology is likely to have a greater impact on 
the rate of economic growth than :my policy of redistribution of rural hold­
ings. I t  has also become apparent that the market outlook for products of 
intensive agricultural settlement is less favourable th:m is the outlook for 
products produced under more extensive pastoral systems, products in which 
Australia clearly has a comparatiYe a<l\':mtage. Third, the rising capital re-
12. Sec Rural Rcconslruclion Commis�ion, Finnncia/ nnd Economic Reconstruction of 
Fnrms, Fourth Report, Co,·cinmcnl Printer, Canbcna 1944, Appendix I. 
JJ. Commom.-calth of ,\u,lralia. Rej1ort of the Dairy Industry Committee of Enq11i1)·. 
GO\crnrncnl P1in:cr, Canberra 1961. 
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quirements o[ modem farming han• increased the cost of go\'ernment-spon­
sorc<l settlement schemes. FinJlly, pulic.y n1akers are coming to realize that 
· in a competitive situation, there is a limit to the priority that can be given to 
equity objccti\·es o\·er efficiency objectives in any land protifammc.14 
Those who fa\'our the abandonment or at least the modification of tradi­
tional clo�cr settlement policr point out that the important restraints to 
rising pro<luctivit)' today are not land and labour, as this policy implies, but  
capit:il and management.1j To cor:tinue to attempt to put  more people on 
smaller-sized farms is to fly in the face of historical tendencies for the rural 
work force to decline and the .�ize of farms to increase. 
I t  is argued that the social reasons ad\·anced in favour of closer settlement 
frequently do not bear critical examination .and that the policy is a very 
crude and unsatisfactory way of trying to achieve a more equitable distribu­
tion of rural income. Such an objecti\'e, it is claimed, could be achieved more 
effective!}' through such measures as progressiYe income taxation, land taxes 
and death duties. The allocation of landholdings by lottery, a procedure by 
which it is possible for large gains to accrue to a few fortunate people, is also 
criticized. However, financial pressures are forcing ]and settlement authori­
ties increasingly to take into account the capital which the intending settler 
has or to which he can get access privately, in determining the eligibility of 
applicants for blocks of la"nd. This has been true of the recent Colleambally 
Settlement Scheme in i\ew South '\Vale$, the Esperance Scheme in '\Vestern 
Australia and the l3rigalow Scheme in Queensland. 
The main economic arguments centre on the question of economies of 
scale. A size of Cann <letermined on the criterion of the 'home maintenance 
area' is not necessarily the most efficient size un<lcr current conditions and 
it is likely to be less so with the pcissage of time. Unfortunately unequivocal 
C\idence on the scale question is not available.16 However, it is evident that 
family fanns considered big enough for wheat farming in the days of horse 
traction arc inadequate to achie\·e realizable economics of scale under mod-
U. Cf. Vernon W. Rullan, '£quily and P1oductivily ls.<ucs in :\!o<lern Agrarian Reform 
ugisl:nion', paper presented lo the Conference organized by the International Economic 
�ociation on Economic Problems of AgriculLUre in Industrial Socic:ties and Repercussions 
in De,·cloping Countries, Rome 1 !l65. 
15. For a useful summary of the issues invoked in the reappraisal of closer settlement 
policy see D. £. Maccallum ti al., 'Closer Settlement in the l!lGOs', journal of the Australian 
Institute of Agricultural Science, Vol 28, No 3, September l!l62. For an advocacy of the: 
roncinuation of closer scttlemc:nt see T. H. Strong. 'Land Tenure: in Australia in Relation 
to Technical Ad\·ancc::s and Closer Settlc:ment'. journal of Farm Economics, Vol 38, No 2, 
May 1956. 
16. Production function analysis has revealed evidence of increasing rc:Lurns to scale in 
the inland paslor.il areas and comL:int returns lo scale in the higher rainfall areas. Sec J. H. 
Duloy, 'The Al loca tion of Resources in the Wool;ilowing Industry', Amira/Ian journal of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol 5,  il:o 2. December l!lGl. Sec al�o J. 1'. Lc:wis, op. cit., pp 100· 
101; and A. C. Lloyd, 'The Economic Si1c of Farms', journal of the Australian Institute of 
Agricultural Science, \'ol 27. No 3, September 19G l .  
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cm tractor technology. The pressing nee� is to find � means of preserving 
sufficient flexibility in the settlement pattern and the associated land legisla­
tion so as not to inhibit the nation from reaping the fruits of continuing 
tedmological advance. The establishment of a cotton industry in northern 
New South \\'ales a few years ago was originally threatened by anachronistic 
lcgislatiYe proYisions go\'erning the size of farms. 
Jn recent years closer settlement has gradually assumed less prominence as 
a n  instrument of go\'ernment policy. This trend is likely to continue, if only 
because of the rising cost of settlement schemes and the realization that they 
tend to benefit the few rather than the many. I t  may also become clearer to 
governments that investment in other directions, whether within agriculture 
(for example, in education and research) or elsewhere in the economy, would 
be likely to contribute more to the economic growth of the nation than the 
innstmcnt of an equivalent amount of government funds in closer settle­
ment activities. 
LEASEHOLD VERSUS ALIE�ATJON 
There has been recurring argument whether additional lancl should be 
alienated. Political beliefs ob,·iously colour attitudes to this question. But in 
an economic context a balance has to be struck between, on the one hand, 
the sayings in private capital in\'estment and the greater public control of 
land use which leasing arrangements permit and, on the other hand, the 
disin.:e!'!tiYe to investment and encouragement of land exploitation which 
often seems to be associated with such anangements. The disadYantages of 
leasehold tenure tend to be more exaggerated the shorter the lease. The 
situation of landholders operating under perpetual leases, we have seen, 
differs little from landholders who own their own land. 
The Rural Reconstruction Commission was asked by the Commonwealth 
government i n  19·13 to recommend the form of tenure which should apply i n  
the settlement o f  ex-sen·icemen after \\'orld \Var I I .  The Commission re­
ported in fa\'our of prh·ate ownership,n but ultimately the Commonwealth 
go\'ernment insisted that land be made a\'ailable under leasehold tenures in 
the 'agent' States·and subsequently the 'principal' States with the exception 
of Victoria followed suit. 
Today, contro\'ersy largely re\'Ol\'es around the leases operating in the 
pastoral areas of Queensland and the Northern Territory. These leases 
usually run irom 25 to 10 years. They do, it should be noted, give the 
go\'ernment the opport11nity to reassess property sizes periodically in the 
light of technological and economic dc,·elopments. Ilowe,·er, as has been 
pointed out earlier, the lessees ckiim that the limited term of the leases is not 
concfuci\'e to their developing their properties. There would seem to be sub­
stance in the Yiew that the achie\'cment of a satisfactory rate of de"elopment 
17. Sec Rural RetJ11st ructi0n Commi�<ion, R111al Lnnd Te1111re and 1'11/1mtion, Ninth 
Report, Go\·ernmc11t Printer, Canberra 1916. 
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of the Northern Australian bed industry will be dependent on the institu­
tion of a more progressive land tenure policy.is 
SOIL A!'\D RANGE CONSERVATION 
Between 1938 when the New South Wales Soil Conservation Service was 
established and the end of \\Torld \Var II, most of the Australian States estab­
lished agencies concerned with the promotion of soil conservation.le From 
the beginning, particular attention was paid to the deterioration of the 
vegetation in the more arid areas and to soil erosion on the catchments of 
major dams. Legislation to enable the government to require corrective 
action on freehold as well as leasehoid land in such areas has gradually been 
introduced, but in few cases have these powers been used. More recently, the 
question of the incorporation of more stringent controls in leases to prevent 
pasture deterioration has arisen. One case involved the short-term snow 
leases in the Australian Alps. Another concerned the pastoral leases in Cen­
tral Australia.�0 In neither case <lid it appear that the J.dministering authority 
had sufficient knowledge of the behaviour and management of the native 
vegetation to be in a position to institute rational controls over grazing.21 
n,\LA::-:CING DE\'ELOP�!El'\T o::-: !'\EW A:"\D OLD LANDS 
Since the turn of the century, a proportion of public investment in land 
de,·elopment has gone into irrigation de\'elri!1ment. �lore lately the discovery 
of minor elemen
.
t deficiencies i n  some areas and the development of chemical 
and mechanical methods of land clearing have opened up new opportunities 
for both corporate and government im·estment. Perhaps the really burning 
question in Australian land policy today concerns the relative advantages of  
public inYestment i n  different �orms of  Janel de,·elopment-irrigation versus 
dry-land development, the opening-up of new lands in ?\orthern Australia 
versus intensification of cle\'elopment in the already developed areas of the 
18. }or discussion of some of the issues with respect to the I\orthem pastoral leases see 
Commonwealth of Australia, Repo1·t of the Board of Inquiry into the Land and Land 
Industries of the Northern Territory of Australia, Government Printer, Canberra 1937; 
Queensland Go,ernment, Report of tile Royal Commission on Pastoral Lands Settlement, 
Government Printer, Brisbane 1951; Queensland Government, Report on Progressive Land 
Settlcn1cnt in Queensland by the Lr.nd Settlement Advisory Commission, GoYernmcnt 
Printer, Brisbane 1959; and H. Barclay, 'Land Tenure in Relation to Agricultural and 
Pastoral DeYelopmcnt', in Proceedings of the Northern Territory Scientific Liaison Con· 
fere11ce, Darwin 1961. 
19. For a reYicw of these deYelopmcnts sec K. 0. Campbell, 'The Dc\·cJopmcnt of Soii 
Consen·ation Programmes in Australia', Land Economics, Vol 24, ::-:o I, February 1918. 
20. See Department of Territories, ::-:orthcrn Territory Land Board, Report 011 the Cen· 
tralian Pas/01al Industry 1111dcr Drought Conditions, Darwin 1964. It is of interest to note 
that this committee reported that the minimum si1e of an economic holding in Central Aus­
tralia was in excess of 600 square miles. 
21. K. 0. Campbell, 'Problems of Adaptation of Pastoral Businesses in the Arid Zone', 
A11stralia11 journal of Agricultural Economirs, \'ol 10, No 1 ,  June 1966, pp 15-16. 
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south an<l so on.�2 Details C?f some of the specific development schemes are 
outlined elsewhere in this book. 
Cle:1rly in a country where Lhe man-land ratio is so low, questions of land 
policy will continue to exercise the public mind. But unless Australians 
come to appreciate better than they do now that other resources are to a 
considerable extent eficcti\'e substitutes for land and water, they will fail to 
achieve the full agricultural potentiality of their country. 
22. See K. 0. Campbell, 'The Rural Dcl'elopmcnt of ;>;orthcrn Australia', Australian 
journal of Agricultural Eco110111irs, Yol 6, :\o I, September 1962; Il. R. Da,·idson, The 
Northern Myth, '.\lelbourne University Press, '.\{elbourne 1965; B. R. Dn·idson and J . .S. 
?\alson, 'Investment Opportunities in Western Australian Agriculture', Farm Policy, Vol 5, 
Xo 4, March 1964; R. W. Prunster, 'Alternati\'cS in Land Dc,·clopmcnt', Farm Policy, 
\'ol 4, 1'\o 3, December 196-1, and K. 0. Campbell, 'An Asscs�mtnt of the C.1sc for Irriga­
tion Development in Australia', in .-\mtralian Academy of Science, ll'nter Resources, Use 
and Management, '.\fclbourne Uni\·crsity Prei�. '.\felbournc 1 964. 
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